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Abstract
This paper considers the problem of pairwise key agreement without public communication between three users
connected through a generalized multiple access channel (MAC). While two users control the channel inputs, all three
users observe noisy outputs from the channel and each pair of users wishes to agree on a secret key hidden from the
remaining user. We first develop a “pre-generated” key-agreement scheme based on secrecy codes for the generalized
MAC, in which the channel is only used to distribute pre-generated secret keys. We then extend this scheme to include
an additional layer of rate-limited secret-key generation by treating the observed channel outputs as induced sources.
We characterize inner and outer bounds on the strong secret-key capacity region for both schemes. For a special case
of the “pre-generated” scheme, we obtain an exact characterization. We also illustrate with some binary examples
that exploiting the generalized nature of the generalized MAC may lead to significantly larger key-agreement rates.
I. INTRODUCTION
Key management and key distribution in modern communication networks are becoming increasingly challenging
because of the dynamic and heterogenous nature of the networks. Among the proposed solutions to address these
challenges, secret-key sharing at the physical layer offers a promising approach to complement traditional public-
key and secret-key cryptographic techniques by obviating the need for pre-shared keys. The premise of secret-key
sharing at the physical layer is to exploit the randomness in the medium as a resource to generate secret keys,
which may then be exploited at the upper layers; one could, for instance, enhance confidentiality, authentication,
and integrity of communications.
The canonical information-theoretic models of secret-key agreement have been introduced in [1], [2]. These
models consider a situation in which two legitimate terminals, observing the outputs of a noisy source or connected
through a noisy channel, attempt to generate a secret key by discussion over a public channel in the presence of
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2an eavesdropper. These models have since been extended in several directions to analyze situations involving more
terminals, e.g., [3], [4], or requiring multiple pairs of keys to be generated, e.g., [5]- [12].
In this paper, we study a three-user model in which two users control the input of a generalized discrete
memoryless multiple-access channel (GDMMAC) while all three users observe the outputs of the channel; each pair
of users attempts to agree on a secret key concealed from the remaining user. This scenario models, for instance,
a noisy environment with honest-but-curious users, in which two users communicate with a base station through
the uplink and overhear each other’s communications. Each user wishes to share a secret key with the base station
hidden from the other user and simultaneously share a secret key with the other user hidden from the base station for
their own private communications. Unlike the related work [12], we do not assume that a public channel is available;
this allows us to capture some limitations of realistic systems in which communications are inherently rate-limited.
In that regard, results and techniques to study secret-key agreement with rate-limited public communication [3] are
particularly relevant to the present work. Our key-sharing scenario encompasses most previous works on secret-key
agreement between three users; for instance, if we just consider key sharing between the two users controlling the
channel inputs, our setting reduces to the problem of key sharing or secret message(s) transmission over two-way
channels as in [13]- [16]. If we ignore key sharing between the two users controlling the channel inputs and only
consider key sharing between each of these users and the third user simultaneously, our setting reduces to the
problem of key sharing or secret message(s) transmission over multiple access channel as in [17].
Specifically, we investigate the performance of two distinct pairwise key sharing schemes. We first study a “pre-
generated” key sharing scheme, in which each of the two active users randomly generates keys that are then encoded
for secure transmission over the channel. This scheme does not exploit the generalized nature of the MAC, and
merely relies on the use of wiretap codebooks combined with rate splitting. We derive inner and outer bounds on the
secret-key capacity region (Theorem 1 and Theorem 2), and we identify a special case in which the bounds match
(Corollary 1). We then study a “generalized scheme” in which the active terminals also exploit the observations
from their noisy channel outputs to generate a key. This scheme extends the “pre-generated” key sharing scheme
by combining rate-limited secret key generation with wiretap codebooks and rate splitting. We again establish inner
and outer bounds on the secret-key capacity region (Theorem 3 and Theorem 4). We illustrate the performance
of both schemes with examples of binary channels that are amenable to numerical calculations (Section III-C and
Section IV-B). In particular, these examples show the potential performance gains brought by the extraction of secret
keys from channel output observations. Another contribution of this work is to establish strong secrecy results, by
leveraging and combining coding techniques for channel resolvability [18], [19] and channel intrinsic randomness
[20]–[22]. It should be noted that “pre-generated” key sharing scheme was partially investigated in [23] with weak
secrecy constraints.
3The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II formally introduces the general model of pairwise
key agreement. Section III analyzes the “pre-generated” key-sharing scheme and characterizes its performance. The
secret-key capacity region is fully characterized for a special case, and results are illustrated with two examples
of binary generalized MAC. Section IV studies the performance of the generalized key-sharing scheme, which is
again illustrated with examples. The technical details of most proofs are relegated in the appendices to streamline
presentation.
II. PAIRWISE SECRET KEY AGREEMENT MODEL
In this section, we introduce our model for pairwise secret key agreement. As illustrated in Fig. 1, we consider
a memoryless generalized MAC (X1,X2, PY1Y2Y3|X1X2 ,Y1,Y2,Y3). User 1 and User 2 control the inputs X1 and
X2, respectively, while Users 1, 2, and 3 observe the outputs Y1, Y2, Y3. respectively. The objective is for each pair
of users to share a secret key while keeping it concealed from the remaining user. Formally, a code for pairwise
key agreement consists of the following.
• Two randomization sequences Vj for j ∈ {1, 2}, used as sources of local randomness for User 1 and User 2.
• Key sets Kjl = {1, · · · , 2nRjl} for j < l ∈ {1, 2, 3}, in which the pairwise keys take values.
• Two sequences of encoding functions f (i)j : Vj ×Yi−1j → Xj for j ∈ {1, 2} and i ∈ {1, · · · , n} allowing User
j, j ∈ {1, 2}, to generate channel input Xij at time instant i, as a function of a randomization sequence Vj
and past observed channel outputs Y i−1j .
• Key generation functions gl, l ∈ {1, 2, 3} available at User l
g1 : V1 × Yn1 → K12 ×K13 (1)
g2 : V2 × Yn2 → K12 ×K23 (2)
g3 : Yn3 → K13 ×K23. (3)
that allow Users j and l to generate Kjl and Kˆjl, respectively, as the shared key between them for j < l ∈
{1, 2, 3}.
Definition 1: A secret-key rate triple (R12, R13, R23) is achievable if for every ε > 0 and all sufficiently large
n, we have:
∀j < l ∈ {1, 2, 3} 1
n
H(Kjl) =
1
n
log |Kjl| ≥ Rjl −  (4)
∀j < l ∈ {1, 2, 3} Pr{Kjl 6= Kˆjl} <  (5)
I(K12;Y
n
3 ) < , and ∀j 6= j¯ ∈ {1, 2} I(Kj3;Xnj¯ , Y nj¯ ) <  (6)
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Fig. 1: Pairwise key sharing over GDMMAC
The set of all the achievable secret-key rate triples (R12, R13, R23) is the secret-key capacity region.
Equation (4) means that the rates R12, R13 and R23 are the rates of nearly uniform secret keys between Users 1
and 2, Users 1 and 3, and Users 2 and 3, respectively. Equation (5) means that each user can correctly estimate the
related keys. Equation (6) means that each user effectively has no information about the other users’ secret keys.
The key rates in Definition 1 are strongly secure since only the total leakage information is bounded by ε. All the
above keys take values in some finite sets.
III. THE PRE-GENERATED KEYS SCHEME OF PAIRWISE SECRET KEY AGREEMENT OVER GDMMAC
In this section, we specialize the generic scheme of Section II to a simpler key-sharing scheme, in which the keys
are “pre-generated”. Specifically, the idea is to have User 1 and User 2 generate keys with their local randomness
and then secretly transmit them to the other users without using the generalized feedback.
A. Principle of Pre-Generated Keys Scheme
As illustrated in Fig. 2, the pre-generated key sharing scheme consists of the following simplifications in the
generic scheme.
• User 1 uses part of its common randomness to generate local keys K12 ∈ K12 and K13 ∈ K13 to share with
Users 2 and 3, respectively. The remaining part is denoted V˜1.
• User 2 uses part of its common randomness to generate local keys K21 ∈ K21 and K23 ∈ K23 to share with
Users 1 and 3, respectively. The remaining part is denoted V˜2.
• User 1’s deterministic encoding and decoding functions are
f1 : V˜1 ×K12 ×K13 → Xn1 and g1 : Yn1 → K21.
• User 2’s deterministic encoding and decoding functions are
f2 : V˜2 ×K21 ×K23 → Xn3 and g2 : Yn2 → K12.
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Fig. 2: Pairwise key sharing over GDMMAC using the pre-generated keys scheme
• User 3’s deterministic decoding function is
g3 : Yn3 → K13 ×K23
At the end of a transmission, the key pair K12,tot = (K12,K21) is shared between User l and User 2, K13 is shared
between User 1 and User 3, and K23 is shared between User 2 and User 3. Note that the shared key between
Users 1 and 2 (K12,tot) consists of two secret keys and hence, rate R12 defined in (4) is the total key rate. This
specialization reduces the generic problem to the simpler problem of secret key distribution, and our analysis of
this scheme only relies on the use of wiretap codes.
B. Main Results
Our main results for the pre-generated key sharing scheme consist of inner and outer bounds on the secret-key
capacity region. We first define the following rates:
r12 = [I(S12;X2, Y2)− I(S12;Y3, S13, S23)]+,
r21 = [I(S21;X1, Y1)− I(S21;Y3, S13, S23)]+,
I12 = I(S12;S21|Y3, S13, S23),
r13 = [I(S13;Y3|S23)− I(S13;X2, Y2, S12|S23)]+,
r23 = [I(S23;Y3|S13)− I(S23;X1, Y1, S21|S13)]+,
I3 = I(S13;S23|Y3) (7)
in which [x]+ = max(x, 0).
Theorem 1: In the pre-generated keys scheme, all rate triples in the closure of the convex hull of the set of rate
6triples (R12, R13, R23) that satisfy the following conditions are achievable:
R12 ≥ 0, R13 ≥ 0, R23 ≥ 0,
R12 ≤ r12+r21 − I12,
R13 ≤ r13,
R23 ≤ r23,
R13 +R23 ≤ r13+r23 − I3,
for random variables taking values in finite sets and with joint distribution factorizing as:
p(s12,s13, s21,s23,x1,x2,y1,y2,y3)=p(s12)p(s13)p(s21)p(s23)p(x1|s12,s13)p(x2|s21,s23)p(y1,y2,y3|x1,x2).
The proof of Theorem 1 is actually a special case of the proof of Theorem 3, which may be found in Appendix A.
We only provide here a high-level description of the scheme achieving the rate region, which is essentially a
combination of wiretap codebooks and rate splitting. The channel model is split into two broadcast channels with
confidential messages; one from User 1 to Users 2 and 3 and the other from User 2 to Users 1 and 3, where in
each broadcast channel, the receivers are eavesdroppers of each other’s key. The rates r12 and r13 correspond to
the well known rates of secure communication between Users 1 and 2 and Users 1 and 3, respectively. Similarly,
r21 and r23 are the rates of secure communication between Users 2 and 1 and, Users 2 and 3, respectively. The
bound on the total key rate between Users 1 and 2 is the sum of the bounds r12 and r21 minus a penalty term
I12, which results from the required independence of the transmitted keys. Similarly, the sum rate of the keys to
User 3 is the sum rate r13+r23 penalized by I3.
Remark 1: If we ignore key sharing between Users 1 and 2, our result reduces to the secrecy rate region of the
generalized multiple access channel with confidential messages [17, Corollary 1] by substituting S12 = S21 = ∅
in Theorem 1. Similarly, if we ignore key sharing between Users 1 and 3 as well as Users 2 and 3, our result
reduces to secret-key sharing in the two-way channel with an external eavesdropper [16, Corollary 1] by substituting
S13 = S23 = ∅ in Theorem 1.
Theorem 2: In the pre-generated keys scheme, if a key rate triple is achievable, then it belongs to the set of all
rate triples (R12, R13, R23) that satisfy:
0 ≤ R12 ≤ I(X1;Y2|X2,Y3)+I(X2;Y1|X1,Y3)+I(Y1;Y2|X1, X2,Y3)+I(X1;Y3|X2, U)− I(X1;Y3|U),
0 ≤ R13 ≤ I(X1;Y3|X2, Y2),
0 ≤ R23 ≤ I(X2;Y3|X1, Y1),
7for random variables U,X1, X2, Y1, Y2, Y3, all taking values in finite sets, such that U − (X1, X2) − (Y1, Y2, Y3)
forms a Markov chain.
Proof: See Appendix D.
C. Special Case and Examples
We now investigate a special case of the model in which the inner and outer bounds in Theorems 1 and 2 match,
hence providing a complete characterization of the secret-key capacity region.
Corollary 1: When the GDMMAC inputs and outputs form Markov chains as X1 − (X2, Y2) − Y3 − Y1 and
X1 − Y3 −X2, the secret-key capacity region is(R1, R2) :
0 ≤ R12 ≤ I(X1;Y2|X2Y3),
R13 = 0,
0 ≤ R23 ≤ I(X2;Y3|X1, Y1)
 (8)
Proof: The achievability can be inferred from Theorem 1 by substituting S12 =X1, S13 =∅, S21 =∅, S23 =X2
and using the Markov chains in the statement of Corollary 1. The converse follows from Theorem 2 since
I(X1;Y2|X2, Y3) + I(X2;Y1|X1, Y3) + I(Y1;Y2|X1, X2, Y3) + I(X1;Y3|X2, U)− I(X1;Y3|U)
(a)
= I(X1;Y2|X2, Y3) + I(X1;Y3|X2, U)− I(X1;Y3|U),
(b)
= I(X1;Y2|X2, Y3) +H(X1|X2, U)−H(X1|U, Y3)− I(X1;Y3|U),
≤ I(X1;Y2|X2, Y3),
and
I(X1;Y3|X2, Y2) (c)= 0.
In the above equations (a) and (c) follow from the Markov chainX1−(X2, Y2)−Y3−Y1 while (b) follows from the
Markov chainX1−Y3−X2.
We now introduce an example in which the Markov chains of Corollary 1 hold. The following lemma turns out
to be useful.
Lemma 1: In the pre-generated keys scheme, if two GDMMACs have the same marginal channel transition
probability distributions p(y1|x1, x2), p(y2|x1, x2) and p(y3|x1, x2), then they have the same secret-key capacity
region.
Since in the pre-generated keys scheme, the channel outputs are not involved in the encoding, Lemma 1 can be
proved using the same approach as in [17, Lemma 1].
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Fig. 3: Erasure Example 1
Example 1: Consider a GDMMAC with inputs alphabet {−1, 1} where erased versions of the inputs are received
by the users according to Fig. 3 as:
Y1 = X2 × E21, Y2 = X1 × E12, Y3 = (X1 × E13, X2 × E23),
in which Eij takes values in {0, 1} with distribution Pr(Eij = 0) = pij . Operation × has the usual meaning
of multiplication and the random variables (X1, X2, E12, E21, E13, E23) are independent of each other. In this
example, we assume that the channels between Users 1 and 2 are symmetric and hence p12 = p21 and furthermore
p13 ≥ p12 ≥ p23. Since p13 ≥ p12, User 1 can only share secret key with User 2 and hence, in Theorem 1, we
set S13 = ∅ and S12 =X1 where X1 is uniformly distributed over {−1, 1}. On the other hand, since p12 ≥ p23,
User 2 dedicates the whole channel input to share a secret key with User 3 by substituting S21 = ∅ and S23 =X2
where X2 is uniformly distributed over {−1, 1}. By substituting the auxiliary random variables in Theorem 1 as
described above, we obtain the following achievable secret-key rate region:(R1, R2) :
0 ≤ R12 ≤ p13 − p12,
R13 = 0,
0 ≤ R23 ≤ p12 − p23.
 (9)
We now use Lemma 1 to show that the rate region in (10) is the capacity region. Consider a new GDMMAC with
channel outputs y1, y′2, y
′
3 at Users 1, 2 and 3, respectively, where
Y1 = X2 × E21, Y ′2 = X1 × E′12, Y ′3 = (X1 × E13, X2 × E′23),
in which E21 and E13 are the erasure random variables in Example 1 and E′12 and E
′
23 are erasure random variables
with erasure probabilities p12 and p23, respectively. E21 and E13 are correlated with E′12 and E
′
23 according to Fig.
4. It can be shown that the following relationships hold between the new channel outputs
Y1 = X2 × E′23 × Ex, Y ′2 = X1 × E′12, Y ′3 = (Y ′2 × Ey, X2 × E′23).
The new channel outputs satisfy the Markov chains of Corollary 1 (replacing Y2 and Y3 with Y ′2 and Y
′
3 ). Therefore,
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Fig. 4: New erasure channel outputs relationships in Example 1
the secret-key capacity region of the new channel is(R1, R2) :
0 ≤ R12 ≤ p13 − p12,
R13 = 0,
0 ≤ R23 ≤ p12 − p23.
 (10)
Since Y ′2 and Y
′
3 have the same marginal distributions as y2 and y3, respectively, according to Lemma 1, the original
channel has the same secret-key capacity region as the new channel and hence, the secret-key capacity region in
(10) is the capacity region.
Example 2: Consider a binary GDMMAC where the relationships between the channel inputs and outputs are
according to:
Yi = X1 +X2 + Zi i = 1, 2, 3,
in which Zi is a binary random variable with distribution Pr(Zi = 1) = pi. Operation + is the binary summation and
the random variables (X1, X2, Z1, Z2, Z3) are independent of each other. We assume that 0 ≤ p2 ≤ p3 ≤ p1 ≤ 0.5.
The other cases can be similarly considered. At first glance, it may seem that because of p2 ≤ p3, the best strategy
for User 1 is to set S12 =X1, S13 = ∅ whereX1 is uniformly distributed over {0, 1}. This is the best strategy for
User 1 to maximize his secret key rate R12, but it would result in R23 = 0 since X1 is uniformly distributed over
{0, 1} and hence I(S23;Y3) = 0. Based on this argument, we assume that X1 is a binary random variable with
parameter α where 0 ≤ α ≤ 0.5. On the other hand, if User 2 sets S21 = ∅, S23 =X2 withX2 uniformly distributed
over {0, 1}, the maximum rate of R23 will be achievable, however it decreases R12 since User 3 decodes X2 and
the leakage rate I(S12;Y3, S23) in the expression of R12 will increase. Hence, we assumeS23 be a binary random
variable connected to X2 by another binary symmetric channel with parameter β, as in Fig. 5 where 0 ≤ β ≤ 0.5.
By substituting the auxiliary random variables in Theorem 1 as described, the following rate region is achievable:
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Fig. 5: Auxiliary random variable S23 in Example 2
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Fig. 6: New channel outputs relationships in Example 2
R12 ≤ h(α ∗ p2) + h(β ∗ p3)− h(α ∗ β ∗ p3)− h(p2),
R13 = 0,
R23 ≤ h(β ∗ p1)− h(β ∗ α ∗ p3) (11)
for all values of 0 ≤ α, β ≤ 0.5, where
α ∗ β , α(1− β) + β(1− α) (12)
h(p) , −p log p− (1− p) log(1− p) (13)
To derive the outer bound on the secret-key capacity region, we use Lemma 1 as in Example 1 to introduce
stochastic degradedness. Since 0 ≤ p2 ≤ p3 ≤ p1 ≤ 0.5, we define a new channel with the same marginal
distributions as in Example 2 where:
Y ′2 = X1 +X2 + Z
′
2,
Y ′3 = X1 +X2 + Z
′
2 + Zx,
Y1 = X1 +X2 + Z
′
2 + Zx + Zy = X1 +X2 + Z1,
in which Z ′2 has the same distribution as Z2 and Zx and Zy are binary random variables with distributions Pr(Zx =
1) = px,Pr(Zy = 1) = py where px and py are defined as in Fig. 6. The random variables (Z ′2, Zx, Zy) are
independent of each other.
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The Markov chain (X1, X2)−Y ′2−Y ′3−Y1 holds between the new channel inputs and outputs and the following
region is an outer bound on the secret-key capacity region of the new channel:
R12 ≤ 1− h(p2), R13 = 0, R23 ≤ h(p1)− h(p3) (14)
where the upper bounds on R13 and R23 are directly inferred from Theorem 2 by considering the Markov chain
(X1, X2)− Y ′2 − Y ′3 − Y1. To deduce the upper bound on R12, using Theorem 2, we have:
R12 ≤ I(X1;Y ′2 |X2,Y ′3)+I(X2;Y1|X1,Y ′3)+I(Y1;Y ′2 |X1,X2,Y ′3)+I(X1;Y ′3 |X2,U)−I(X1;Y ′3 |U)
(a)
= I(X1;Y
′
2 |X2,Y ′3)+I(X1;Y ′3 |X2, U)− I(X1;Y ′3 |U)
≤ I(X1;Y ′2 |X2,Y ′3)+I(X1;Y ′3 |X2, U)
(b)
= I(X1;Y
′
2 |X2,Y ′3)+H(Y ′3 |X2, U)−H(Y ′3 |X1, X2)
≤ I(X1;Y ′2 |X2,Y ′3)+ I(X1;Y ′3 |X2)
= I(X1;Y
′
2 ,Y
′
3 |X2)
(c)
= I(X1;Y
′
2 |X2)
where (a) and (c) are deduced from the Markov chain (X1, X2) − Y ′2 − Y ′3 − Y1 and (b) from the distribution of
U . Since the new channel and the original channel have the same marginal distributions, then the outer bound in
(14) holds for the original channel.
The rate region (R23, R12) in (11) along with the outer bound in (14) are shown in Fig. 7 for different values of
p1, p2 and p3. In addition, the rate region in (11) is compared with the rate region obtained from the time sharing
between Users 1 and 2.
IV. THE GENERALIZED SCHEME OF PAIRWISE SECRET KEY AGREEMENT OVER GDMMAC
We now analyze the “generalized key sharing” scheme, in which the channel outputs allowed by the generalized
feedback are used as induced sources for key generation. In contrast to the pre-generated keys scheme in Section III,
the channel outputs at Users 1 and 2 are used as inputs to the encoders and hence, the channel inputs are stochastic
functions of not only the pre-generated keys but also the previous channel outputs. The encoding and decoding
functions refer to those introduced in Section II. In the generalized scheme, key sharing is achieved in two stages
so that the final key Kij shared between User i and User j for i < j ∈ {1, 2, 3} is composed of two sub-keys; a
randomly pre-generated key randomly produced by User i and another key generated as a stochastic function of
the received channel output Y ni at user i. This procedure is performed over multiple blocks of n channel uses, and
the detailed achievable scheme is given in the following subsection.
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Fig. 7: Comparison of the bounds for different values of p1, p2 and p3 in Example 2
A. Main Results
We first define the following rates:
r12,p = [I(S12;X2, Y2)− I(S12;Y3, S13, S23, T13, T23)]+,
r21,p = [I(S21;X1, Y1)− I(S21;Y3, S13, S23, T13, T23)]+,
I12,p = I(S12;S21|Y3, S13, S23, T13, T23),
r13,p = [I(S13;Y3|S23)− I(S13;X2, Y2, S12, T12|S23)]+,
r23,p = [I(S23;Y3|S13)− I(S23;X1, Y1, S21, T21|S13)]+,
I3,p = I(S13;S23|Y3)
r12,s = [I(T12;X2, Y2|S12, S21)− I(T12;Y3, S13, S23, T13, T23|S12, S21)]+,
r21,s = [I(T21;X1, Y1|S12, S21)− I(T21;Y3, S13, S23, T13, T23|S12, S21)]+,
I12,s = I(T12;T21|Y3, S13, S23, T13, T23, S12, S21),
r13,s = [I(T13;Y3|S13, S23, T23)− I(T13;X2, Y2, S12, T12|S13, S23, T23)]+,
r23,s = [I(T23;Y3|S13, S23, T13)− I(T23;X1, Y1, S21, T21|S13, S23, T13)]+,
I3,s = I(T13;T23|Y3, S13, S23) (15)
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Theorem 3: In the generalized scheme, all rate triples in the closure of the convex hull of the set of rate triples
(R12, R13, R23) that satisfy the following conditions are achievable:
R12 ≥ 0, R13 ≥ 0, R23 ≥ 0,
R12 ≤ [r12,p + r21,p − I12,p]+ + [r12,s + r21,s − I12,s]+,
R13 ≤ r13,p + r13,s,
R23 ≤ r23,p + r23,s,
R13 +R23 ≤ [r13,p+r23,p − I3,p]+ + [r13,s+r23,s − I3,s]+,
for random variables taking values in finite sets and with joint distribution factorizing as:
p(s12,s13, s21,s23, t12,t13, t21,t23,x1,x2,y1,y2,y3)=p(s12)p(s13)p(s21)p(s23)p(x1|s12,s13)p(x2|s21,s23)
p(y1,y2,y3|x1,x2)p(t12|x1,y1,s12)p(t13|x1,y1, s13)p(t21|x2,y2,s21)p(t23|x2,y2, s23) (16)
and subject to the constraints:
I(T12;X1, Y1|X2, Y2, S12, S21) ≤ I(S12;X2, Y2),
I(T13;X1, Y1|Y3, S13, S23, T23) ≤ I(S13;Y3|S23),
I(T21;X2, Y2|X1, Y1, S12, S21) ≤ I(S21;X1, Y1),
I(T23;X2, Y2|Y3, S13, S23, T13) ≤ I(S23;Y3|S13),
I(T13, T23;X1, Y1, X2, Y2|Y3, S13, S23) ≤ I(S13, S23;Y3) (17)
The proof of Theorem 3 is given in Appendix A. Note that each individual rate bound consists of two parts: a
primary rate (denoted by subscript “p”) and a secondary rate (denoted by subscript “s”). This split reflect the two-
step key generation process behind the achievability proof. The primary rates are associated with the pre-generated
keys randomly generated and sent by Users 1 and 2 through the channel, as in Theorem 1. The secondary rates are
generated by Users 1 and 2 after receiving the channel outputs, which are exploited as induced sources to generate
additional keys. Intuitively, the form of the bound for R12 originates from the two-way channel between Users 1
and 2 in which User 3 acts as an external eavesdropper. Similarly, the form of the bounds for R13 and R23 stems
from the generalized MAC from Users 1 and 2 to User 3, in which Users 1 and 2 eavesdrop each other. For the
secondary keys, a combination of secret sharing codebooks and superposition coding is used at Users 1 and 2 as
well as random binning based on Probability Mass Function (PMF) approximation arguments [25]. Finally, note
that the constraints in (17) reflect the absence of public channel, sot that all the required information to reconstruct
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Fig. 8: Key sharing scheme associated with Theorem 3
the secondary keys should be sent through noisy channels.
This procedure is performed over multiple blocks. At each block, by n uses of the channel, each of Users 1 and
2 encodes pre-generated keys (primary keys) plus the secondary keys induced from the channel outputs received at
the end of the previous block. In Theorem 3, Sij and Tij are the auxiliary random variables relevant to the primary
and secondary keys Kij,p and Kij,s, respectively, which are generated by User i to be shared with User j where
i ∈ {1, 2}, j ∈ {1, 2, 3} and i 6= j.
A simple illustration of the encoding is shown in Fig. 8. The primary key k1ij,p is randomly generated to be
shared between Users i and j in the first block of n channel uses. At the end of the first block, by receiving
the corresponding outputs, the secondary key of the first block k1ij,s is generated as a stochastic function of the
received outputs to be shared between Users i and j. The required information of the secondary key is sent through
n channel uses in the second block along with the required information of the second block primary key, i.e., k2ij,p
which is generated randomly and independently of the first block secondary key. The constraints in (17) reflect
this fact. In this scheme, the secondary key k1ij,s is decoded and shared between Users i and j at the end of the
second block in addition to the primary key of the second block k2ij,p. The same procedure is performed B blocks.
Assuming rij,p and rij,s be the rates of the primary and secondary keys, respectively, the total rate of the shared
key between Users i and j at the end of block B is:
R¯ij =
nBrij,p + n(B − 1)rij,s
nB
which is approximately equal to rij,p + rij,s if B is large enough.
Remark 2: The auxiliary random variables S12 and S13 (resp. S21 and S23) could be made dependent in (16).
If this were the case, additional constraints should be added to (17) according to Marton’s bound for the broadcast
channel from User 1 to Users 2 and 3 (resp. from User 2 to Users 1 and 3). For the sake of simplicity, we assume
that S12 and S13 (resp. S21 and S23) are independent.
Remark 3: If we cancel the secondary keys generation by setting T12 = T13 = T21 = T23 = ∅ in Theorem 3,
then the rate region reduces to the one in Theorem 1.
Theorem 4: In the generalized scheme, if a key rate triple is achievable, then it belongs to the set of all rate
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triples (R12, R13, R23) that satisfy:
0 ≤ R12 ≤ I(X1;Y2|X2,Y3)+I(X2;Y1|X1,Y3)+I(Y1;Y2|X1,X2,Y3)+I(X1;Y3|X2,U)−I(X1;Y3|U),
0 ≤ R13 ≤ I(X1, Y1;Y3|X2, Y2),
0 ≤ R23 ≤ I(X2, Y2;Y3|X1, Y1),
for random variables U,X1, X2, Y1, Y2, Y3, all taking values in finite sets, such that U − (X1, X2) − (Y1, Y2, Y3)
forms a Markov chain.
Proof: See Appendix E.
B. A Binary Example
In this section, we discuss a binary example to illustrate the benefits of the generalized scheme. To clarify the
effect of involving the channel outputs in the pairwise key sharing, we modify Example 2 in such a way that the
binary noises received over the channel are correlated and hence, given the channel inputs, the channel outputs can
be considered as correlated sources.
Example 3: Consider a binary GDMMAC where the relationships between the channel inputs and outputs are
according to:
Y1 = X1 +X2 + Z1 + Z2 + Z3,
Y2 = X1 +X2 + Z2,
Y3 = X1 +X2 + Z2 + Z3,
in which Z1, Z2 and Z3 are binary random variables with distributions Pr(Zi = 1) = pi where 0 < pi ≤ 0.5 for
i = 1, 2, 3. Operation + is binary summation and the random variables (X1, X2, Z1, Z2, Z3) are independent of each
other. In this example, there is a physical degradedness in the channel and the Markov chain (X1, X2)−Y2−Y3−Y1
holds between the channel inputs and outputs. Since the received noises over the channel are not independent, the
channel outputs have the role of correlated sources to produce the secondary keys. In particular, because of the
Markov chain Y2 − Y3 − Y1 between the channel outputs, Users 1 and 2 can, respectively, share secondary keys
K13,s and K23,s with User 3 but they cannot share any secondary key with each other, i.e., K12,s = K21,s = ∅.
Since the required information of secondary key K13,s should be sent through the channel form User 1 to User
3, we can not set S13 = ∅ as in Example 2. We change the auxiliary random variables of the pre-generated keys
scheme in Example 2 such that X1 = S12 + S13 where Pr(S12 = 1) = α and Pr(S13 = 1) = α′. The auxiliary
random variables S21 and S23 are substituted the same as in Example 2, i.e., S21 = ∅ and Pr{S23 =X2} = 1− β,
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where X2 = Ber(0.5).
For the secondary key generation, Users 1 and 2, respectively, consider auxiliary random variables T13 and T23 to
share secret keys with User 3 and set T12 = T21 = ∅ since they can not share a secondary key between themselves
due to Markov chain Y2 − Y3 − Y1. According to the constraints in (17), noisy versions of the channel outputs at
Users 1 and 2 are considered as auxiliary random variables of the secondary keys, i.e., T13 = Y1+Z ′1, T23 = Y2+Z
′
2
where Z ′1 and Z
′
2 are independently binary noises such that Pr(Z
′
1 = 1) = α
′′ and Pr(Z ′2 = 1) = β
′. By substituting
the auxiliary random variables in Theorem 3 as described, the following key rate region is achievable:
R12 ≤ [hx − hy − h(α′ ∗ p2) + h(α ∗ α′ ∗ p2)]+,
R13 ≤ h(p1 ∗ p3 ∗ α′′)− h(p1 ∗ α′′),
R23 ≤ [h(β ∗ p1 ∗ p2 ∗ p3)− h(α ∗ β ∗ p2 ∗ p3)]++
[hz − hy + h(α ∗ β ∗ p2 ∗ p3)− h(β ∗ p1 ∗ p2 ∗ p3)]+ (18)
subject to:
h(α′′ ∗ p1)− h(α′′) ≤ h(α ∗ α′ ∗ β ∗ p2 ∗ p3)− h(α ∗ β ∗ p2 ∗ p3),
h(α′′ ∗ p1)− h(α′′) + hy − h(β′) ≤ 1,
where hx,hy and hz are defined as:
hx = f(β ∗ p2, p3, β′),
hy = f(α ∗ β ∗ p2, p3, β′),
hz = f(β ∗ p2, p1 ∗ p3, β′),
f(a, b, c) = −(abc+ abc) log(abc+ abc)
−(abc+ abc) log(abc+ abc)
−(abc+ abc) log(abc+ abc)
−(abc+ abc) log(abc+ abc),
for all values of 0 ≤ α, α′, α′′, β, β′,≤ 0.5.
In the above equations p = 1− p and, operations ∗ and h(.) are defined the same as in (12) and (13).
If we substitute S13 = T13 = T23 = ∅ in Example 3 or equivalently α′′ = β′ = 0.5 and α′ = 0 in rate region
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(18), then the rate region of the pre-generated keys scheme is deduced as:
R12 ≤ [h(β ∗ p2 ∗ p3)− h(αβ ∗ p2 ∗ p3)− h(α′ ∗ p2) + h(α ∗ α′ ∗ p2)]+,
R13 = 0,
R23 ≤ [h(β ∗ p1 ∗ p2 ∗ p3)− h(α ∗ β ∗ p2 ∗ p3)]+. (19)
The following region is an outer bound of the secret-key capacity region for the generalized scheme in Example
3:
R12 ≤ 1− h(p2),
R13 ≤ h(p1 ∗ p3)− h(p1),
R23 ≤ h(p1 ∗ p3)− h(p3) (20)
which is directly deduced from Theorem 4 since we have:
R12 ≤ I(X1;Y2|X2, Y3) + I(X2;Y1|X1, Y3) + I(Y1;Y2|X1, X2, Y3) + I(X1;Y3|X2, U)− I(X1;Y3|U),
(a)
= I(X1;Y2|X2, Y3) + I(X1;Y3|X2, U)− I(X1;Y3|U)
≤ I(X1;Y2|X2, Y3) + I(X1;Y3|X2, U),
= I(X1;Y2|X2, Y3) +H(Y3|X2, U)−H(Y3|X1, X2, U)
≤ I(X1;Y2|X2, Y3) +H(Y3|X2)−H(Y3|X1, X2, U),
(b)
= I(X1;Y2|X2, Y3) +H(Y3|X2)−H(Y3|X1, X2),
= I(X1;Y2|X2, Y3) + I(X1;Y3|X2) = I(X1;Y2, Y3|X2),
(c)
= I(X1;Y2|X2) ≤ 1− h(p2),
R23 ≤ I(X2, Y2;Y3|X1, Y1) = H(Y3|X1, Y1)−H(Y3|X1, Y1, X2, Y2)
= H(X2 + Z2 + Z3|X2 + Z1 + Z2 + Z3)−H(Z2 + Z3|Z2, Z1 + Z2 + Z3)
= H(X2 + Z2 + Z3|X2 + Z1 + Z2 + Z3)−H(Z3|Z1 + Z3)
≤ h(p1)−H(Z3|Z1 + Z3) = h(p1 ∗ p3)− h(p3).
and
R13 ≤ I(X1, Y1;Y3|X2, Y2) (d)= I(Y1;Y3|Y2) = h(p1 ∗ p3)− h(p1).
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In the above equations, (a), (c) and (d) are inferred from the Markov chain (X1, X2)− Y2 − Y3 − Y1 and (b) is
deduced from the distribution of U .
The key rate regions of the pre-generated keys and the generalized schemes in (19) and (18) along with the outer
bound in (20) are compared in Fig. 9 for different values of the noises. In order to clarify the regions, we projected
each 3-D region into three 2-D regions. It is seen that the generalized scheme strictly has a better performance
compared to the pre-generated keys scheme. By using the pre-generated keys scheme, we can only achieve two
non-zero secret-key rates while using the generalized scheme, we attain all three non-zero rates and obtain rate
regions which are significantly larger compared to the former scheme.
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Fig. 9: Comparison of the two schemes and the outer bound for Binary Example 3
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THE INNER BOUND IN THEOREM 3 (INCLUDING PROOF OF THEOREM 1)
We fix the distribution of all random variables involved in the coding scheme as defined Theorem 3. Key sharing
is performed over B blocks, each comprised of n uses of the channel. In what follows, we describe the code
construction, the associated encoding and decoding, and the security analysis, in the i-th block. The boldface
random variable X (resp. x) denotes n repetitions of random variable X , i.e., Xn (resp. its realization x). Xi (resp.
xi) denotes Xin(i−1)n+1 (resp. x
in
(i−1)n+1), i.e, n successive repetitions of random variable X associated with block i
(resp. its successive realizations). Xi:j denotes Xjn(i−1)n+1 and correspondingly, x
i:j denotes n(j− i+1) realizations
of X from block i to j.
Code Construction
User j independently generates 2n(rjl,p+r
′
jl,p) codewords sjl, for j < l ∈ {1, 2, 3} according to the i.i.d. distribution∏n
i=1 p(sjl,i) which are labeled as:
sjl(kjl,p,k′jl,p),kjl,p∈Kjl,p={1,...,2nrjl,p},k′jl,p∈K′jl,p={1,...,2nr
′
jl,p}.
Each sequence sjl can be determined if the indices (kjl,p, k′jl,p) are known. The index kjl,p represents the pre-
generated key to be shared between Users j and l while k′jl,p is a randomization index drawn from the local
randomness.
Moreover, User j chooses sequences tjl according to i.i.d. distribution
∏n
i=1 p(tjl,i) and, it randomly and
independently bins all sequences tjl as follows:
• index φjl(tjl) is uniformly generated over [1,2nrjl ]. We set kjl,s = φ(tjl) as the secondary key to be shared
between Users j and l.
• index ψjl(tjl) is uniformly generated over [1,2nr
′
jl ]. We set k′jl,s = ψ(tjl) as the index sent to User l such
that it can reconstruct Tjl.
• index θjl(tjl) is uniformly generated over [1,2nr
′′
jl ]. We set k′′jl,s = θ(tjl) as the index also used by User l to
reconstruct tjl. We assume that a specific index k′′jl,s is publicly shared between Users j and l ahead of time.
Note that, unlike traditional source models for key generation, there is no public channel over which to transmit
the index k′jl,s. To transmit the index over the noisy channel, we will have to explicitly define how to encode it
into a codeword sjl. To this end, for j ∈ {1, 2}, l ∈ {1, 2, 3}, j 6= l, we define functions
fjl : S˜jl → K′jl,s,
where S˜jl is the set of 2n(rjl,p+r′jl,p) indices pairs (kjl,p, k′jl,p). Each fjl is a random partitioning of S˜jl into 2nr
′
jl,s
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equal-sized parts. Elements of part i are labeled as (S˜jl)i. We implicitly assume that the following condition holds
r′jl,s < (rjl,p + r
′
jl,p) (21)
Later on, It will be seen that this assumption holds because of the rate constraints (17) in Theorem 3.
Encoding in block i
At the beginning of block i, we assume that k
′′i−1
jl,s is chosen uniformly at random from its corresponding
set and is publicly shared between Users j and l. We will later show that under specific conditions, the
users can agree on specific values of k
′′i−1
jl,s ahead of time so that this assumption can be dropped. Sequences
y1:i−11 , x
1:i−1
1 , s
1:i−1
12 , s
1:i−1
13 , t
1:i−2
12 , t
1:i−2
13 are available at User 1, who can also decode sequences s
1:i−1
21 t
1:i−2
21 .
User 1 then generates sequence ti−112 according to distribution PT12|Y1X1S12K′′12,s , and sequence t
i−1
13 according to
distribution PT13|Y1X1S13K′′13,s . Similarly, User 2 generates sequences t
i−1
21 and t
i−1
23 . Subsequently, User j computes
the secondary key of block i− 1 for sharing with User l as ki−1jl,s = φjl(ti−1jl ) and the index to be sent to User l to
reconstruct ti−1jl as k
′i−1
jl,s = ψjl(t
i−1
jl ). As stated earlier k
′′i−1
jl,s = θjl(t
i−1
jl ) is already shared between Users j and l.
User j encodes k
′i−1
jl,s in such a way that he finds the respective part (S˜jl)k′i−1jl,s according to partitioning function
fjl, and then it randomly chooses a pair (kjl,p, k′jl,p) from (S˜jl)k′i−1jl,s . For the selected (kjl,p, k
′
jl,p), User j picks
up sequence sijl(kjl,p, k′jl,p). Then, User j selects the respective index kjl,p of sijl as the primary key of block i for
sharing with User l, i.e., kijl,p. In this way, Users 1 and 2 choose (si12, si13) and (si21, si23), respectively. The channel
inputs of block i are sent over the GDMMAC according to the distributions p(x1|s12, s13) and p(x2|s21, s23) by
Users 1 and 2, respectively, through n channel uses.
Decoding of block i
We let T n′ (PX) denote the set of ′−strongly typical sequences xn with respect to distribution p(x). At the end
of block i, Users 1, 2 and 3 receive yi1, yi2 and yi3 through the channel, respectively. With access to (xi1, yi1), User
1 declares an error unless there exists a unique si21(ki21,p, k
′i
21,p) such that (xi1, yi1, si21)∈T n1 (PX1,Y1,S21). User 2 acts
in the symmetric way and decodes si12. With access to yi3, User 3 declares an error unless there exists a unique
pair (si13(ki13,p, k
′i
13,p), si23(ki23,p, k
′i
23,p)) such that (yi3, si13, si23)∈T n1 (PY3,S13,S23).
After decoding the primary keys of block i, users decode the secondary keys of block i− 1. In particular, using
function f21, User 1 finds mapping (S˜21)q21 of the pair indices (ki21,p, k
′i
21,p) related to the decoded si21 and sets
k
′i−1
21,s = q21. Furthermore, as we assumed at the beginning of the encoding step, index k
′′i−1
21,s is available at User 1.
With access to indices k
′i−1
21,s and k
′′i−1
21,s , and the sequences (x
i−1
1 , y
i−1
1 , s
i−1
12 , s
i−1
21 ), User 1 decodes sequence t
i−1
21
if (ti−121 (k
i−1
21,s, k
′i−1
21,s , k
′′i−1
21,s ), x
i−1
1 , y
i−1
1 , s
i−1
12 , s
i−1
21 ) ∈ T n2 (PT21,X1,Y1|S12,S21), when such ti−121 exists and is unique.
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Otherwise, it declares an error. User 2 exploits mapping f12 to find k
′i−1
12,s and decodes t
i−1
12 in the symmetric
way. User 3 uses mappings f13 and f23 to find k
′i−1
13,s and k
′i−1
23,s . With access to the indices k
′i−1
13,s , k
′i−1
23,s , and
the shared indices k
′′i−1
13,s , k
′′i−1
23,s and the sequences (y
i−1
3 , s
i−1
13 , s
i−1
23 ), User 3 decodes sequence pair (t
i−1
13 , t
i−1
23 )
if (ti−113 (k
i−1
13,s, k
′i−1
13,s , k
′′i−1
13,s ), t
i−1
23 (k
i−1
23,s, k
′i−1
23,s , k
′′i−1
23,s ), y
i−1
3 , s
i−1
13 , s
i−1
23 ) ∈ T n2 (PT13,T23,Y3|S13,S23), when such pair
(ti−113 , t
i−1
23 ) exists and is unique. Otherwise, it declares an error.
Reliability analysis
If we set:
r12,p + r
′
12,p < I(S12;X2, Y2) (22)
r21,p + r
′
21,p < I(S21;X1, Y1) (23)
r13,p + r
′
13,p < I(S13;Y3|S23) (24)
r23,p + r
′
23,p < I(S23;Y3|S13) (25)
r13,p + r
′
13,p + r23,p + r
′
23,p < I(S13, S23;Y3) (26)
and if we choose 1 = 16B , it can be shown with standard arguments that the average of the primary decoding
error probabilities P (n)ej,p at User j are bounded by
E(P
(n)
e1,p) ≤ 21 =

8B
(27)
E(P
(n)
e2,p) ≤ 21 =

8B
(28)
E(P
(n)
e3,p) ≤ 41 =

4B
(29)
for n sufficiently large. In (27)-(29), expectation is taken over the randomly generated code and all the binning
functions where the error probabilities are conditioned to them. Notice that (22)-(23) reflect the point-to-point nature
of the channel between Users 1 and 2, while (24)-(26) reflect the multiple access nature of the channel to User 3.
The analysis of the error probability for the secondary keys requires slightly more care. Note that the induced
probability distribution by the encoding scheme is:
P˜K12,sK′12,sK′′12,sK13,sK′13,sK′′13,sK21,sK′21,sK′′21,sK23,sK′23,sK′′23,sT12T13T21T23X1X2Y1Y2Y3S12S13S21S23 =
PK12,s|T12PK′12,s|T12PK′′12,sPK13,s|T13PK′13,s|T13PK′′13,sPK21,s|T21PK′21,s|T21PK′′21,sPK23,s|T23PK′23,s|T23PK′′23,s×
PT12|X1Y1S12K′′12,sPT13|X1Y1S13K′′13,sPT21|X2Y2S21K′′21,sPT23|X2Y2S23K′′23,sPX1X2Y1Y2Y3S12S13S21S23 (30)
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We will show that this distribution is nearly indistinguishable from the distribution
PK12,sK′12,sK′′12,sK13,sK′13,sK′′13,sK21,sK′21,sK′′21,sK23,sK′23,sK′′23,sT12T13T21T23X1X2Y1Y2Y3S12S13S21S23 =
PK12,s|T12PK′12,s|T12PK′′12,s|T12PK13,s|T13PK′13,s|T13PK′′13,s|T13PK21,s|T21PK′21,s|T21PK′′21,s|T21PK23,s|T23×
PK′23,s|T23PK′′23,s|T23PT12|X1Y1S12PT13|X1Y1S13PT21|X2Y2S21PT23|X2Y2S23PX1X2Y1Y2Y3S12S13S21S23 (31)
To this aim, we use the fact that index k′′jl,s is generated at random by User j independently of the other
available sequences for j = 1, 2. In particular, K ′′12,s is independent of (Y1,X1,S12) and K
′′
13,s is independent of
(Y1,X1,S13). Symmetrically, K ′′21,s is independent of (Y2,X2,S21) and K
′′
23,s is independent of (Y2,X2,S23).
It follows from standard results [25] that if
r′′12,s < H(T12|Y1, X1, S12) (32)
r′′13,s < H(T13|Y1, X1, S13) (33)
r′′21,s < H(T21|Y2, X2, S21) (34)
r′′23,s < H(T23|Y2, X2, S23) (35)
then there exist α12 > 0, α13 > 0, α21 > 0 and α23 > 0 such that:
E(D(PK′′12,sY1X1S12 ‖ qK′′12,sPY1X1S12)) ≤ 2−nα12 (36)
E(D(PK′′13,sY1X1S13 ‖ qK′′13,sPY1X1S13)) ≤ 2−nα13 (37)
E(D(PK′′21,sY2X2S21 ‖ qK′′21,sPY2X2S21)) ≤ 2−nα21 (38)
E(D(PK′′23,sY2X2S23 ‖ qK′′23,sPY2X2S23)) ≤ 2−nα23 (39)
in which q represents uniform distribution over the respective set. We now set:
O12 = (X1,Y1,S12) (40)
O13 = (X1,Y1,S13) (41)
O21 = (X2,Y2,S21) (42)
O23 = (X2,Y2,S23) (43)
O3 = Y3 (44)
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Then, we have
D(PT12T13T21T23O12O13O21O23O3 ‖ P˜T12T13T21T23O12O13O21O23O3)
(a)
≤ D(PK′′12,sK′′13,sK′′21,sK′′23,sT12T13T21T23O12O13O21O23O3 ‖ P˜K′′12,sK′′13,sK′′21,sK′′23,sT12T13T21T23O12O13O21O23O3)
(b)
= D(PK′′12,sK′′13,sT12T13O12O13‖P˜K′′12,sK′′13,sT12T13O12O13)+D(PK′′21,sK′′23,sT21T23O21O23‖P˜K′′21,sK′′23,sT21T23O21O23)
=
∑
k′′12,sk
′′
13,st12t13o12o13
P (k′′12,s, k
′′
13,s, t12, t13,o12,o13) log2
P (k′′12,s, k
′′
13,s, t12, t13,o12,o13)
P˜ (k′′12,s, k
′′
13,s, t12, t13,o12,o13)
+
∑
k′′21,sk
′′
23,st21t23o21o23
P (k′′21,s, k
′′
23,s, t21, t23,o21,o23) log2
P (k′′21,s, k
′′
23,s, t21, t23,o21,o23)
P˜ (k′′21,s, k
′′
23,s, t21, t23,o21,o23)
=
∑
k′′12,sk
′′
13,st12t13o12o13
P (k′′12,s, k
′′
13,s, t12, t13,o12,o13) log2
P (t12, t13|k′′12,s, k′′13,s,o12,o13)P (k′′12,s, k′′13,s,o12,o13)
P (t12, t13|k′′12,s, k′′13,s,o12,o13)qk′′12,sqk′′13,sp(o12,o13)
+
∑
k′′21,sk
′′
23,st21t23o21o23
P (k′′21,s, k
′′
23,s, t21, t23,o21,o23) log2
P (t21, t23|k′′21,s, k′′23,s,o21,o23)P (k′′21,s, k′′23,s,o21,o23)
P (t21, t23|k′′21,s, k′′23,s,o21,o23)qk′′21,sqk′′23,sp(o21,o23)
(c)
=
∑
k′′12,sk
′′
13,st12t13o12o13
P (k′′12,s, k
′′
13,s, t12, t13,o12,o13) log2
P (k′′12,s|o12)P (k′′13,s|o13)p(o12,o13)
qk′′12,sqk′′13,sp(o12,o13)
+
∑
k′′21,sk
′′
23,st21t23o21o23
P (k′′21,s, k
′′
23,s, t21, t23,o21,o23) log2
P (k′′21,s|o21)P (k′′23,s|o23)p(o21,o23)
qk′′21,sqk′′23,sp(o21,o23)
=
∑
k′′12,sk
′′
13,st12t13o12o13
P (k′′12,s, k
′′
13,s, t12, t13,o12,o13) log2
P (k′′12,s|o12)P (k′′13,s|o13)
qk′′12,sqk′′13,s
+
∑
k′′21,sk
′′
23,st21t23o21o23
P (k′′21,s, k
′′
23,s, t21, t23,o21,o23) log2
P (k′′21,s|o21)P (k′′23,s|o23)
qk′′21,sqk′′23,s
=
∑
k′′12,sk
′′
13,st12t13o12o13
P (k′′12,s, k
′′
13,s, t12, t13,o12,o13)(log2
P (k′′12,s|o12)
qk′′12,s
+ log2
P (k′′13,s|o13)
qk′′13,s
)
+
∑
k′′21,sk
′′
23,st21t23o21o23
P (k′′21,s, k
′′
23,s, t21, t23,o21,o23)(log2
P (k′′21,s|o21)
qk′′21,s
+ log2
P (k′′23,s|o23)
qk′′23,s
)
= D(PK′′12,sO12‖qK′′12,sPO12)+D(PK′′13,sO13‖qK′′13,sPO13)+D(PK′′21,sO21‖qK′′21,sPO21)+D(PK′′23,sO23‖qK′′23,sPO23)
(d)
≤ 2−nα12 + 2−nα13 + 2−nα21 + 2−nα23 (45)
where in the above equations, (a) follows from the relative entropy properties [27], (b) follows from the auxiliary
random variables distributions in (30) and (31), (c) follows from distribution P in (31) that results in the following
Markov chains:
K ′′12,s −T12 −O12 −O13 −T13 −K ′′13,s
K ′′21,s −T21 −O21 −O23 −T23 −K ′′23,s
and (d) is deduced from (36)-(39).
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Hence, the distance between the two probabilities P and P˜ is arbitrarily small. Consequently the decoding error
probability of the secondary keys can be analyzed for the much simpler distribution P .
It follows from standard results of Slepian-Wolf coding [24] that if
r′12,s+r
′′
12,s> H(T12|X2, Y2, S12, S21) (46)
r′21,s+r
′′
21,s> H(T21|X1, Y1, S12, S21) (47)
r′13,s+r
′′
13,s> H(T13|Y3, S13, S23, T23) (48)
r′23,s+r
′′
23,s> H(T23|Y3, S13, S23, T13) (49)
r′13,s+r
′′
13,s+r
′
23,s+r
′′
23,s> H(T13, T23|Y3, S13, S23) (50)
and if we set 2 = 16B , then
E(P
(n)
e1,s) ≤ 22 =

8B
(51)
E(P
(n)
e2,s) ≤ 22 =

8B
(52)
E(P
(n)
e3,s) ≤ 42 =

4B
(53)
for sufficiently large n.
Finally, we show that we can select a specific k
′′∗
21,s ahead of time so that need not be transmitted. In fact by
assuming C as the random variable representing randomly generated code and all binning functions, we have:
E(P
(n)
e1,s) = EC(Pr{T21 6= g1(O12,K′21,s,K′′21,s)|C}) =
EC(
∑
k′′21,sk
′
21,so12o21t21
1
2nr
′′
21,s
PK′21,s|T21(k
′
21,s|t21)PT21|O21K′′21,s(t21|o21, k
′′
21,s)PO12O21(o12,o21)1[t21 6=g1(o12, k′21,s, k′′21,s)|C])
= EK′′21,sC(Pr{T21 6= g1(O12,K
′
21,s,K
′′
21,s)}|K′′21,s, C) ≤ 
8B
(54)
Hence, there exists k
′′∗
21,s such that:
E(P
(n)
e1,s) = EC(Pr{T21 6= g1(O12,K ′21,s, k
′′∗
21,s)|C}) <
3
8B
(55)
Similarly, there exist k
′′∗
12,s, k
′′∗
13,s and k
′′∗
23,s such that:
E(P
(n)
e2,s) = EC(Pr{T12 6= g2(O21,K ′12,s, k
′′∗
12,s)|C}) <
3
8B
(56)
E(P
(n)
e3,s) = EC(Pr{(T13,T23) 6= g3(O3,K ′13,s, k
′′∗
13,s,K
′
23, k
′′∗
23,s)|C}) <
3
4B
(57)
Repeating the above encoding and decoding procedures over B blocks, the total decoding error probability at
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User j ∈ {1, 2, 3} is bounded as
E(P
(nB)
j ) ≤ B(E(P (n)ej,p) + E(P (n)ej,s))
(a)
< ,
where (a) is deduced from (27)-(29) and (55)-(57).
Remark 4: combining (46)-(50) and (32)-(35), we obtain:
r′12,s> I(T12;X1, Y1|X2, Y2, S12, S21) (58)
r′21,s> I(T21;X2, Y2|X1, Y1, S12, S21) (59)
r′13,s> I(T13;X1, Y1|Y3, S13, S23, T23) (60)
r′23,s> I(T23;X2, Y2|Y3, S13, S23, T13) (61)
r′13,s+r
′
23,s > I(T13, T23;X1, Y1, X2, Y2|Y3, S13, S23) (62)
The necessary condition (21) in definition of the functions f12, f13, f21 and f23 holds according to the rate constraints
(17) in Theorem 3 and equations (22)-(26) and (58)-(62).
Remark 5: In the code construction of the primary keys, we implicitly assumed that I(S12;X2, Y2) ≥
I(S12;Y3, S13, S23, T13, T23). In the case where I(S12;X2, Y2) < I(S12;Y3, S13, S23, T13, T23), User 1 randomly
maps k′12,s into a space with 2
n(I(S12;X2,Y2)−δ′()) elements and no primary key is chosen by User 1 to
be shared with User 2 and the bound on the rate of the primary key between Users 1 and 2 is equal to
[I(S21;X1, Y1) − I(S21;Y3, S13, S23, T13, T23)]+ in (15). Similarly, we implicitly assumed that I(S13;Y3|S23) ≥
I(S13;X2, Y2, S12, T12|S23). In the case where I(S13;Y3|S23) < I(S13;X2, Y2, S12, T12|S23), User 1 randomly
maps k′13,s into a space with 2
n(I(S13;Y3|S23)−δ′′()) elements and no primary key is chosen by User 1 to be shared
with User 3 and the bound on the sum rate of r13,p+r23,p is equal to [I(S23;Y3|S13)−I(S23;X1, Y1, S21, T21|S13)]+
in (15). The same is true for User 2’s codebook.
Remark 6: In the code construction of the secondary keys, we assumed that
I(T12;X2, Y2|S12, S21) − I(T12;Y3, S13, S23, T13, T23|S12, S21) ≥ 0, respectively I(T21;X1, Y1|S12, S21) −
I(T21;Y3, S13, S23, t13, t23|S12, S21) ≥ 0. Otherwise, we set T12 = φ, respectively T21 = φ. The same is true in
deriving r13,s + r23,s.
Security Analysis
We now analyze the security condition of Definition 1. Performing the described encoding and decoding
procedures in B blocks, the first secrecy constraint in (6) specializes as
I((K12,p,K21,p,K12,s,K21,s)
1:B ;Y1:B3 |(K ′′12,s,K ′′21,s)1:B) <  (63)
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where (K12,s,K21,s)B = ∅. We have:
I((K12,p,K21,p,K12,s,K21,s)
1:B ;Y1:B3 |(K′′12,s,K′′21,s)1:B)
≤ I((K12,p,K21,p,K12,s,K21,s,K′′12,s,K′′21,s)1:B ;Y1:B3 )
=
B∑
i=1
I((K12,p,K21,p,K12,s,K21,s,K
′′
12,s,K
′′
21,s)
i;Y1:B3 |(K12,p,K21,p,K12,s,K21,s,K′′12,s,K′′21,s)1:i−1)
≤
B∑
i=1
I((K12,p,K21,p,K12,s,K21,s,K
′′
12,s,K
′′
21,s)
i;Y1:B3 , (K12,p,K21,p,K12,s,K21,s,K
′′
12,s,K
′′
21,s)
1:i−1) (64)
=
B∑
i=1
[I((K12,p,K21,p)
i;Y1:B3 , (K12,p,K21,p,K12,s,K21,s,K
′′
12,s,K
′′
21,s)
1:i−1)
+I((K12,s,K21,s,K
′′
12,s,K
′′
21,s)
i;Y1:B3 , (K12,p,K21,p,K12,s,K21,s,K
′′
12,s,K
′′
21,s)
1:i−1|(K12,p,K21,p)i)]
≤
B∑
i=1
[
Ai︷ ︸︸ ︷
I((K12,p,K21,p)
i;Y1:B3 , (K12,p,K21,p,K12,s,K21,s,K
′′
12,s,K
′′
21,s)
1:i−1)
+ I((K12,s,K21,s,K
′′
12,s,K
′′
21,s)
i;Y1:B3 , (K12,p,K21,p,K12,s,K21,s,K
′′
12,s,K
′′
21,s)
1:i−1, (K12,p,K21,p)
i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bi
]
We analyze each of the above terms separately. Some Markov chains useful in the security analysis are given in
(65)-(69). These Markov chains arise from the coding scheme.
(K12,p,K21,p)
i−(K′12,s,K′21,s,K′13,s,K′23,s)i−1−(K12,p,K21,p,K12,s,K21,s,K′′12,s,K′′21,s,Y3)1:i−1 (65)
(K12,p,K21,p)
i−(K′12,s,K′21,s,K′13,s,K′23,s)i−(Y3)i+1:B (66)
(K12,p,K21,p)
i−(Y3, S13, S23)i−(K′12,s,K′21,s,K′13,s,K′23,s)i−1 (67)
(K12,s,K21,s,K
′′
12,s,K
′′
21,s)
i−(S12, S21, S13, S23)i−(K12,p,K21,p,K12,s,K21,s,K′′12,s,K′′21,s,Y3)1:i−1 (68)
(K12,s,K21,s,K
′′
12,s,K
′′
21,s)
i−(K′12,s,K′21,s,K′13,s,K′23,s)i−(Y3)i+1:B (69)
For term Ai, we have:
Ai = I((K12,p,K21,p)
i;Y1:B3 , (K12,p,K21,p,K12,s,K21,s,K′′12,s,K′′21,s)1:i−1)
≤ I((K12,p,K21,p)i;Y1:B3 , (K12,p,K21,p,K12,s,K21,s,K′′12,s,K′′21,s)1:i−1, (K′12,s,K′21,s,K′13,s,K′23,s)i−1:i)
(a)
= I((K12,p,K21,p)
i;Yi:B3 , (K′12,s,K′21,s,K′13,s,K′23,s)i−1:i)
(b)
= I((K12,p,K21,p)
i;Yi3, (K′12,s,K′21,s,K′13,s,K′23,s)i−1:i)
≤ I((K12,p,K21,p)i;Yi3, Si13, Si23, (K′12,s,K′21,s,K′13,s,K′23,s)i−1:i)
(c)
= I((K12,p,K21,p)
i;Yi3, Si13, Si23, (K′12,s,K′21,s,K′13,s,K′23,s)i)
(d)
≤ I((K12,p,K21,p)i;Yi3, Si13, Si23,Ti13,Ti23, (K′12,s,K′21,s)i)
= I((K12,p,K21,p)
i;Yi3, Si13, Si23,Ti13,Ti23) + I((K12,p,K21,p)i; (K′12,s,K′21,s)i|Yi3, Si13, Si23,Ti13,Ti23)
(e)
≤
A1i︷ ︸︸ ︷
I((K12,p,K21,p)
i;Yi3, S
i
13, S
i
23,T
i
13,T
i
23)+
A2i︷ ︸︸ ︷
I((K′12,s,K
′
21,s)
i;Yi3, S
i
12, S
i
21, S
i
13, S
i
23,T
i
13,T
i
23)
where in the above equations, (a), (b) and (c) are, respectively, due to Markov chains (65), (66) and (67). (d) holds
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since k′13,s and k
′
23,s are indices of sequences t13 and t23, respectively. (e) is true due to the fact that k12,p and
k21,p are indices of sequences s12 and s21, respectively.
For term Bi, we have:
Bi = I((K12,s,K21,s,K
′′
12,s,K
′′
21,s)
i;Y1:B3 , (K12,p,K21,p,K12,s,K21,s,K′′12,s,K′′21,s)1:i−1, (K12,p,K21,p)i)
(a)
≤ I((K12,s,K21,s,K′′12,s,K′′21,s)i;Y1:B3 , (K12,p,K21,p,K12,s,K21,s,K′′12,s,K′′21,s)1:i−1, (S12, S21)i)
≤ I((K12,s,K21,s,K′′12,s,K′′21,s)i;Y1:B3 , (K12,p,K21,p,K12,s,K21,s,K′′12,s,K′′21,s)1:i−1, (S12, S21, S13, S23)i)
(b)
= I((K12,s,K21,s,K
′′
12,s,K
′′
21,s)
i;Yi:B3 , (S12, S21, S13, S23)i)
≤ I((K12,s,K21,s,K′′12,s,K′′21,s)i;Yi:B3 , (S12, S21, S13, S23)i, (K′12,s,K′21,s,K′13,s,K′23,s)i)
(c)
= I((K12,s,K21,s,K
′′
12,s,K
′′
21,s)
i;Yi3, (S12, S21, S13, S23)i, (K′12,s,K′21,s,K′13,s,K′23,s)i)
≤ I((K12,s,K21,s,K′′12,s,K′′21,s)i;Yi3, (S12, S21, S13, S23,T13,T23)i, (K′12,s,K′21,s)i)
(d)
=
B1i︷ ︸︸ ︷
I((K12,s,K21,s,K
′′
12,s,K
′′
21,s)
i;Yi3, (S12, S21, S13, S23,T13,T23)
i|(K′12,s,K′21,s)i)
where in the above equations, (a) is due to the fact that k12,p and k21,p are indices of sequences s12 and s21,
respectively. (b) and (c) are deduced from Markov chains (68) and (69), respectively. (d) holds since the indices
are independent of each other.
We continue by combining three terms A1i, A2i and B1i. Since in all the three terms, only block index i appears,
we drop it in the following. Security condition (63) appears as:
I((K12,p,K21,p,K12,s,K21,s)
1:B ;Y1:B3 |(K′′12,s,K′′21,s)1:B) ≤ B(A1 +A2 +B1) =
B(I(K12,p,K21,p;Y3,S13,S23,T13,T23)+I(K12,s,K21,s,K′12,s,K
′
21,s,K
′′
12,s,K
′′
21,s;Y3,S12,S21,S13,S23,T13,T23)) (70)
We analyze the two terms in (70) separately. Specifically, we use Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 as follows.
Lemma 2: If
r′12,p+ r
′
21,p >I(S12, S21;Y3, S13, S23, T13, T23) + 2
′ (71)
r′12,p>I(S12;Y3, S13, S23, T13, T23) + 2
′ (72)
r′21,p>I(S21;Y3, S13, S23, T13, T23) + 2
′ (73)
r′13,p>I(S13;X2, Y2, S12, T12)+ 2
′ (74)
r′23,p>I(S23;X1, Y1, S21, T21)+ 2
′ (75)
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then we have
I(K12,p,K21,p;Y3,S13,S23,T13,T23) <

2B
(76)
I(K13,p;Y2,X2,S12,T12) <

2B
(77)
I(K23,p;Y1,X1,S21,T21) <

2B
(78)
The proof of Lemma 2 is given in Appendix B.
Lemma 3: If
r12,s + r
′
12,s + r
′′
12,s+ r21,s + r
′
21,s + r
′′
21,s <H(T12, T21|Y3, S12, S21, S13, S23, T13, T23)− 2′′ (79)
r12,s + r
′
12,s + r
′′
12,s<H(T12|Y3, S12, S21, S13, S23, T13, T23)− 2′′ (80)
r21,s + r
′
21,s + r
′′
21,s<H(T21|Y3, S12, S21, S13, S23, T13, T23)− 2′′ (81)
r13,s + r
′
13,s + r
′′
13,s<H(T13|X2, Y2, S12, S13, T12)− 2′′ (82)
r23,s + r
′
23,s + r
′′
23,s<H(T23|X1, Y1, S21, S23, T21)− 2′′ (83)
then we have
I(K12,s,K21,s,K
′
12,s,K
′
21,s,K
′′
12,s,K
′′
21,s;Y3,S12,S21,S13,S23,T13,T23) <

2B
(84)
I(K13,s,K
′
13,s,K
′′
13,s;Y2,X2,S12,S13,T12) <

2B
(85)
I(K23,s,K
′
23,s,K
′′
23,s;Y1,X1,S21,S23,T21) <

2B
(86)
The proof of Lemma 3 is given in Appendix C.
Combining (70), (76) and (84), the strong secrecy condition of the key between Users 1 and 2 is deduced as:
I((K12,p,K21,p,K12,s,K21,s)
1:B ;Y1:B3 |(K ′′12,s,K ′′21,s)1:B) ≤  (87)
Using similar Markov chains as in (65)-(69) for keys K13,p,K23,p,K13,s,K23,s and exploiting Lemma 2 and 3,
the other strong secrecy conditions in (6) are deduced as:
I((K13,p,K13,s)
1:B ; (X2,Y2)1:B |(K ′′13,s)1:B) ≤  (88)
I((K23,p,K23,s)
1:B ; (X1,Y1)1:B |(K ′′23,s)1:B) ≤  (89)
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Replacing equations (71)-(75) in (22)-(26), we obtain:
r12,p < I(S12;X2, Y2)− I(S12;Y3, S13, S23, T13, T23) , r12,p,
r21,p < I(S21;X1, Y1)− I(S21;Y3, S13, S23, T13, T23) , r21,p,
r12,p + r21,p < I(S12;X2, Y2) + I(S21;X1, Y1)− I(S12, S21;Y3, S13, S23, T13, T23)
= r12,p + r21,p − I12,p,
r13,p < I(S13;Y3|S23)− I(S13;Y2, X2, S12, T12|S23) , r13,p,
r23,p < I(S23;Y3|S13)− I(S23;Y1, X1, S21, T21|S13) , r23,p,
r13,p + r23,p < I(S13, S23;Y3)− I(S13;Y2, X2, S12, T12|S23)− I(S23;Y1, X1, S21, T21|S13)
= r13,p + r23,p − I3,p (90)
By setting r12,p = r12,p + r21,p, r13,p = r13,p, r23,p = r23,p and applying Fourier-Motzkin elimination [26] to the
above region, the primary keys rates of Theorem 3 (and also Theorem 1) are derived.
Replacing equations (79)-(83) with (46)-(50), the following rates are achievable for the secondary keys:
r12,s < I(T12;X2, Y2|S12, S21)− I(T12;Y3, S13, S23, T13, T23|S12, S21) , r12,s,
r21,s < I(T21;X1, Y1|S12, S21)− I(T21;Y3, S13, S23, T13, T23|S12, S21) , r21,s,
r12,s + r21,s < I(T12;X2, Y2|S12, S21) + I(T21;X1, Y1|S12, S21)− I(T12;T21|S12, S21)
−I(T12, T21;Y3, S13, S23, T13, T23|S12, S21) = r12,s + r21,s − I12,s,
r13,s < I(T13;Y3|S13, S23, T23)− I(T13;X2, Y2, S12, T12|S13, S23, T23) , r13,s,
r23,s < I(T23;Y3|S13, T13, S23)− I(T23;X1, Y1, S21, T21|S13, T13, S23) , r23,s,
r13,s + r23,s<I(T13,T23;Y3|S13,S23)−I(T13;T23|S13,S23)−I(T13;X2,Y2,S12,T12|S13,S23,T23)−
I(T23;X1, Y1, S21, T21|S13, T13, S23) = r13,s + r23,s − I3,s (91)
By setting r12,s = r12,s + r21,s, r13,s = r13,s, r23,s = r23,s and applying Fourier-Motzkin elimination [26] to the
above region, the secondary keys rates of Theorem 3 are derived.
To show that the total rate of the secret key between Users 1 and 2 is the sum of the rates r12,p and r12,s, we
should prove the independence of the primary and the secondary keys. Since K12,p and K21,p are indices of S12
and S21, respectively, (84) implies that:
I(K12,s,K21,s;K12,p,K21,p) ≤ ,
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and hence:
H(K12,s,K21,s,K12,p,K21,p) ≥ H(K12,s,K21,s) +H(K12,p,K21,p)− .
Furthermore, we need to prove the independence of the primary and the secondary keys of different blocks.
Referring to (64), we have:
B∑
i=1
I((K12,p,K21,p,K12,s,K21,s)
i;Y1:B3 , (K12,p,K21,p,K12,s,K21,s)
1:i−1) < 
and hence:
B∑
i=1
I((K12,p,K21,p,K12,s,K21,s)
i; (K12,p,K21,p,K12,s,K21,s)
1:i−1) < 
which proves the independence of the keys of different blocks.
Similar arguments as above hold for the key between Users 1 and 3, and also the key between Users 2 and 3.
Finally the following rate is achievable between Users j ∈ {1, 2} and l ∈ {1, 2, 3} where j 6= l:
Rjl =
nBr¯jl,p + n(B − 1)r¯jl,s
nB
which is approximately equal to r¯jl,p + r¯jl,s if B is large enough. Hence, the achievability of the secret-key rate
region in Theorem 3 is deduced according to (90) and (91).
This completes achievability of the key rate region in Theorem 3 in strong sense.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF STRONG SECRECY OF THE PRIMARY KEYS IN THEOREM 3
We note that in the pre-generated keys scheme, the generalized nature of the GDMMAC as feedback is not exploited,
and the observations are merely used as side information. Consequently, the mechanisms exploited for secrecy reduce
to secure communication over a wiretap channel. In this scheme, strong secrecy can be obtained as a byproduct of
channel resolvability. Specifically, given a message M to be secured against an observation Zn, notice that:
I(M ;Zn) = D(pMZn ‖ pMpZn) ≤ EM (D(pZn|M ‖ qZn)) (92)
for any qZn ∈ ∆(Zn).
We start by establishing a general result that we use in the sequel to prove the strong secrecy of the pre-generated
keys in Lemma 2 of Appendix A. We consider the general model illustrated in Fig. 10 in which each user is active
and generates keys to share with the other two users. In this model, kij is the key generated by User i to be
shared with User j which should be kept secret from the remaining user as the potential eavesdropper where
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Fig. 10: Model for Proposition 1
i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, i 6= j and Sij is the respective auxiliary random variable to kij . The channel output Y n represents
the output received by the potential eavesdropper which can be any of the three users. Since the model is symmetric,
it is sufficient to prove strong secrecy of the keys shared between each pair of the users and then, the result can be
extended to the other pairs’ secret keys. In continue, we consider the case where User 3 is the eavesdropper and
we intend to prove strong secrecy of the keys between Users 1 and 2, i.e., (k12, k21). We assume that User 3 has
already decoded his intended codewords sn13(k13, k
′
13) and s
n
23(k23, k
′
23) from Users 1 and 2, respectively. Hence,
User 3’s observation is zn = (yn, xn3 , k13, k
′
13, k23, k
′
23). In Proposition 1, strong secrecy of the keys between Users
1 and 2 against User 3’s observation is given by using the inequality in (92). In continue, the notations are borrowed
from Appendix A.
Proposition 1:
E(D(PnY nXn3 K13K′13K23K′23|K12K21 ‖ P̂
n
Y nXn3 K13K
′
13K23K
′
23
))→ 0 (93)
for sufficiently large n.
Proof:
Let Q ∈ ∆(S12 × S13 × S21 × S23 × S31 × S32 × X1 × X2 × X3 × Y) denote the PMF defined by the
channel and the random coding argument. The independent and identically distributed (iid) product distribution
on ∆(Sn12 × Sn13 × Sn21 × Sn23 × Sn31 × Sn32 × Xn1 × Xn2 × Xn3 × Yn) is denoted by Q⊗n. In contrast let Pn ∈
∆(Sn12 × Sn13 × Sn21 × Sn23 × Sn31 × Sn32 × Xn1 × Xn2 × Xn3 × Yn) denote the distribution induced by the coding
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scheme. By construction:
Pn (k12, k
′
12, k13, k
′
13, k21, k
′
21, k23, k
′
23, k31, k
′
31, k32, k
′
32,x1,x2,x3,y) ,
Q⊗n (y|x1,x2,x3)Q⊗n(x1|s12(k12, k′12)s13(k13, k′13))Q⊗n(x2|s21(k21, k′21)s23(k23, k′23))
Q⊗n(x3|s31(k31, k′31)s32(k32, k′32))
1
|K12||K′12||K13||K′13||K21||K′21||K23||K′23||K31||K′31||K32||K′32|
. (94)
where |Kij | is the cardinality of key set Kij .
Define:
P̂nY nXn3 K13K′13K23K′23(y,x3, k13, k
′
13, k23, k
′
23) , Q⊗nY n|Xn3 Sn13Sn23(y|x3, s13(k13, k
′
13), s23(k23, k
′
23))
PnXn3 K13K′13K23K′23(x3, k13, k
′
13k23, k
′
23). (95)
We analyze E(D(PnY nXn3 K13K′13K23K′23|K12=k12K21=k21 ‖ P̂
n
Y nXn3 K13K
′
13K23K
′
23
)), where the average is over the
randomly generated code. Note that:
D(PnY nXn3 K13K′13K23K′23|K12=k12K21=k21 ‖ P̂
n
Y nXn3 K13K
′
13K23K
′
23
)
=
∑
yx3k13k′13k23k
′
23
Pn(y,x3, k13, k
′
13, k23, k
′
23|k12, k21) log2
Pn(y,x3, k13, k
′
13, k23, k
′
23|k12, k21)
P̂n(y,x3, k13, k′13, k23, k
′
23)
=
∑
x3k13k′13k23k
′
23
Pn(x3, k13, k
′
13, k23, k
′
23)
∑
y
Pn(y|x3, k13, k′13, k23, k′23, k12, k21)
log2
Pn(y|x3, k13, k′13, k23, k′23, k12, k21)
Q⊗nY n|Xn3 Sn13Sn23(y|x3s13(k13, k
′
13)s23(k23, k
′
23))
(96)
where by construction:
Pn(x3,k13,k
′
13,k23,k
′
23)=
∑
k31k′31k32k
′
32
Q⊗n(x3|s31(k31,k′31)s32(k32,k′32))
1
|K13||K′13||K23||K′23||K31||K′31||K32||K′32|
(97)
and
Pn(y|x3, k13, k′13, k23, k′23, k12, k21) =∑
x1x2k′12k
′
21
Q⊗n(y|x1x2x3)Q⊗n(x1|s12(k12,k′12)s13(k13,k′13))Q⊗n(x2|s21(k21,k′21)s23(k23,k′23))
1
|K′12||K′21|
(98)
so that
33
D(PnY nXn3 K13K′13K23K′23|K12=k12K21=k21 ‖ P̂
n
Y nXn3 K13K
′
13K23K
′
23
) =
1
|K′12||K′21||K13||K′13||K23||K′23||K31||K′31||K32||K′32|∑
yx1x2x3k
′
12k
′
21k13k
′
13k23k
′
23k31k
′
31k32k
′
32
Q⊗n(y|x1x2x3)Q⊗n(x1|s12(k12, k′12)s13(k13, k′13))
Q⊗n(x2|s21(k21, k′21)s23(k23, k′23))Q⊗n(x3|s31(k31, k′31)s32(k32, k′32))
log2
∑
x˜1x˜2k˜
′
12k˜
′
21
Q⊗n(y|x˜1x˜2x3)Q⊗n(x˜1|s12(k12,k˜′12)s13(k13,k′13))Q⊗n(x˜2|s21(k21,k˜′21)s23(k23,k′23)) 1|K′12||K′21|
Q⊗nY n|Xn3 Sn13Sn23
(y|x3s13(k13, k′13)s23(k23, k′23))
(99)
Let us focus on the average of the log term, taking the average over all codewords s12 and s21 except than
s12(k12, k
′
12) and s21(k21, k
′
21). Then,
E(log2
∑
x˜1x˜2k˜
′
12k˜
′
21
Q⊗n(y|˜x1x˜2x3)Q⊗n(x˜1|s12(k12,k˜′12)s13(k13,k′13))Q⊗n(˜x2|s21(k21, k˜′21)s23(k23,k′23)) 1|K′12||K′21|
Q⊗nY n|Xn3 Sn13Sn23
(y|x3s13(k13,k′13)s23(k23, k′23))
)
(a)
≤ log2
E(
∑
x˜1x˜2k˜
′
12k˜
′
21
Q⊗n(y|˜x1x˜2x3)Q⊗n(˜x1|s12(k12,k˜′12)s13(k13,k′13))Q⊗n(˜x2|s21(k21,k˜′21)s23(k23,k′23)) 1|K′12||K′21| )
Q⊗nY n|Xn3 Sn13Sn23
(y|x3s13(k13,k′13)s23(k23,k′23))
= log2
(
1
|K′12||K′21|
∑
x˜1x˜2
Q⊗n(y|˜x1x˜2x3)Q⊗n(˜x1|s12(k12,k′12)s13(k13,k′13))Q⊗n(x˜2|s21(k21, k′21)s23(k23, k′23))
Q⊗nY n|Xn3 Sn13Sn23
(y|x3s13(k13, k′13)s23(k23, k′23))
+
|K′12| − 1
|K′12||K′21|
∑
x˜1x˜2
Q⊗n(y|x˜1x˜2x3)Q⊗n(x˜1|s13(k13, k′13))Q⊗n(x˜2|s21(k21, k′21)s23(k23, k′23))
Q⊗nY n|Xn3 Sn13Sn23
(y|x3s13(k13, k′13)s23(k23, k′23))
+
|K′21| − 1
|K′12||K′21|
∑
x˜1x˜2
Q⊗n(y|x˜1x˜2x3)Q⊗n(x˜1|s12(k12, k′12)s13(k13, k′13))Q⊗n(x˜2|s23(k23, k′23))
Q⊗nY n|Xn3 Sn13Sn23
(y|x3s13(k13, k′13)s23(k23, k′23))
+
(|K′12| − 1)(|K′21| − 1)
|K′12||K′21|
∑
x˜1x˜2
Q⊗n(y|x˜1x˜2x3)Q⊗n(x˜1|s13(k13, k′13))Q⊗n(x˜2|s23(k23, k′23))
Q⊗nY n|Xn3 Sn13Sn23
(y|x3s13(k13, k′13)s23(k23, k′23))
)
≤ log2
(
1
|K′12||K′21|
Q⊗n(y|x3s12(k12, k′12)s13(k13, k′13)s21(k21, k′21)s23(k23, k′23))
Q⊗nY n|Xn3 Sn13Sn23
(y|x3s13(k13, k′13)s23(k23, k′23))
+
1
|K′21|
Q⊗n(y|x3s13(k13, k′13)s21(k21, k′21)s23(k23, k′23))
Q⊗nY n|Xn3 Sn13Sn23
(y|x3s13(k13, k′13)s23(k23, k′23))
+
1
|K′12|
Q⊗n(y|x3s12(k12, k′12)s13(k13, k′13)s23(k23, k′23))
Q⊗nY n|Xn3 Sn13Sn23
(y|x3s13(k13, k′13)s23(k23, k′23))
+
Q⊗n(y|x3s13(k13, k′13)s23(k23, k′23))
Q⊗nY n|Xn3 Sn13Sn23
(y|x3s13(k13, k′13)s23(k23, k′23))
)
(100)
where (a) is deduced from Jensen’s inequality.
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Substituting the upper bound of (100) back and taking the average over all other codewords, we obtain,
E(D(PnY nXn3 K13K′13K23K′23|K12K21 ‖ P̂
n
Y nXn3 K13K
′
13K23K
′
23
))
≤
∑
yx3s12s13s21s23
Q⊗n(yx3s12s13s21s23) log2
(
1
|K′12||K′21|
Q⊗n(y|x3s12s13s21s23)
Q⊗nY n|Xn3 Sn13Sn23(y|x3, s13, s23)
+
1
|K′21|
Q⊗n(y|x3s13s21s23)
Q⊗nY n|Xn3 Sn13Sn23(y|x3, s13, s23)
+
1
|K′12|
Q⊗n(y|x3s12s13s23))
Q⊗nY n|Xn3 Sn13Sn23(y|x3, s13, s23)
+ 1
)
(101)
We split the sum between the sequences that are jointly typical, and those that are not.
• If (y,x3, s12, s13, s21, s23) ∈ T n′ (QY X3S12S13S21S23), the log argument is upper bounded by
2n(I(S12,S21;Y |X3,S13,S23)+2
′)
|K′12||K′21|
+
2n(I(S21;Y |X3,S13,S23)+2
′)
|K′21|
+
2n(I(S12;Y |X3,S13,S23)+2
′)
|K′12|
+1 (102)
If we have
r′12 + r
′
21 > I(S12, S21;Y |X3, S13, S23) + 2′. (103)
r′21 > I(S21;Y |X3, S13, S23) + 2′ (104)
r′12 > I(S12;Y |X3, S13, S23) + 2′. (105)
then for sufficiently large n, the log argument can be bounded by 3′ + 1.
• If (y,x3, s12, s13, s21, s23) /∈ T n′ (QY X3S12S13S21S23), the log term is upper bounded by log2(3µ−n+1) where
µ , min
Q(y|x3s13s23)>0
Q(y|x3s13s23). (106)
Hence, the sum over the non typical sequences is bounded by ′ log2(3µ
−n + 1).
Finally, the sum in (101) is bounded as
E(D(PnY nXn3 K13K′13K23K′23|K12K21 ‖ P̂
n
Y nXn3 K13K
′
13K23K
′
23
)) ≤ ′ log2(3µ−n + 1) + log(3′ + 1) (107)
which vanishes as n goes to infinity and ′ goes to zero.
Now, we follow secure communication between each pair of the users in the pre-generated keys scheme using
the general result in Proposition 1. Since the model in Fig. 10 is symmetric, we can appropriately substitute the
random variables to deduce secrecy from resolvability condition against the intended user. In particular:
• by substituting Y = Y3, X3 = S31 = S32 = K31 = K32 = K ′31 = K
′
32 = φ in Fig. 10 and using Proposition
1, secrecy from resolvability condition against User 3 is obtained.
• by substituting Y = Y2, X3 = S31 = S32 = K31 = K32 = K ′31 = K
′
32 = φ in Fig. 10 and using Proposition
35
1, secrecy from resolvability condition against User 2 is obtained.
• by substituting Y = Y1, X3 = S31 = S32 = K31 = K32 = K ′31 = K
′
32 = φ in Fig. 10 and using Proposition
1, secrecy from resolvability condition against User 1 is obtained.
Lemma 4 (Secrecy from channel resolvability conditions): If (71)-(75) hold, then there exist α > 0, β > 0 and
γ > 0 such that
E(D(PnY n3 K13K′13K23K′23|K12K21 ‖ P̂
n
Y n3 K13K
′
13K23K
′
23
)) ≤ 2−αn (108)
E(D(PnY n2 Xn2 K12K′12|K13 ‖ P̂
n
Y n2 X
n
2 K12K
′
12
)) ≤ 2−βn (109)
E(D(PnY n1 Xn1 K21K′21|K23 ‖ P̂
n
Y n1 X
n
1 K21K
′
21
)) ≤ 2−γn (110)
To deduce (76)-(78) in Lemma 2 in Appendix A, we substitute Y3 = (Y3, T13, T23), Y2 = (Y2, T12) and Y1 =
(Y1, T21) in (108)-(110) and use the independence of auxiliary random variables S12, S13, S21 and S23.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF STRONG SECRECY OF THE SECONDARY KEYS IN THEOREM 3
In the generalized scheme, both wiretap coding and secret key generation are used where the latter uses the
channel outputs correlation as induced sources. For the wiretap codebook, the channel resolvability was used in
Appendix B to prove strong secrecy of the primary keys. For the secondary keys, the outputs of the GDMMAC
are exploited as source observations to share secret keys and the transmitted information by Users 1 and 2 needs
to satisfy (46)-(50). We consider the secondary keys generation between Users 1 and 2 and prove strong secrecy
for the secondary key pair (k12,s, k21,s) where the notations are borrowed from Appendix A. Here, we drop the
index s since we just deal with the secondary keys. The secondary keys generation between Users 1 and 2 against
User 3 is shown in Fig. 11.
The objective is to extract uniformly distributed keys k12 ∈ {1,...,2nr12} and k21 ∈ {1,...,2nr21} at User 2 and
User 1, respectively, where the keys are independent of each other and of User 3’s observation, i.e.,
z = zn = (yn3 , t
n
13, t
n
23, s
n
13, s
n
23, s
n
12, s
n
21) (111)
We assume that User 3 has already decoded his intended codewords tn13 and t
n
23 of the secondary keys from
Users 1 and 2, respectively, and all the codewords of the primary keys, i.e., (sn13, s
n
23, s
n
12, s
n
21). To prove Lemma
3 in Appendix A, we show that:
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Fig. 11: Model for Proposition 2
Proposition 2:
I(K12,K21,K
′
12,K
′
21,K
′′
12,K
′′
21;Z
n) ≤
E(D(PK12,K21,K′12,K′21,K′′12,K′′21,Zn ‖ qK12qK21qK′12qK′21qK′′12qK′′21PZn))→ 0 (112)
for sufficiently large n, where qKij , qK′ij and qK′′ij have uniform distributions over {1,...,2nrij}, {1,...,2nr
′
ij} and
{1,...,2nr′′ij}, respectively, for i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j.
Proof: To prove Proposition 2, we use the random binning mappings φij , ψij and θij as defined in Appendix
A.
Using the law of total probability, the joint distribution pk12,k21,k′12,k′21,k′′12,k′′21,zn can be expressed as follows:
p(k12, k21, k
′
12, k
′
21, k
′′
12, k
′′
21, z
n) =
∑
t12t21
p(t12, t21, z) Pr{φ12(t12) = k12}Pr{ψ12(t12) = k′12}
Pr{θ12(t12) = k′′12}Pr{φ21(t21) = k21}Pr{ψ21(t21) = k′21}Pr{θ21(t21) = k′′21} (113)
To simplify the notation, we define:
P (φij , ψij , θij , tij , kij , k
′
ij , k
′′
ij),Pr{φij(tij)=kij}Pr{ψij(tij)=k′ij}Pr{θij(tij)=k′′ij} (114)
Now, we evaluate EΦ12Ψ12Θ12Φ21Ψ21Θ21(D(PK12,K21,K′12,K′21,K′′12,K′′21,Zn‖qK12qK21qK′12qK′21qK′′12qK′′21PZn)).
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By definition, we have:
D(PK12,K21,K′12,K′21,K′′12,K′′21,Zn ‖ qK12qK21qK′12qK′21qK′′12qK′′21PZn)
=
∑
k12k21k
′
12k
′
21k
′′
12k
′′
21z
p(k12, k21, k
′
12, k
′
21, k
′′
12, k
′′
21, z) log2
p(k12, k21, k
′
12, k
′
21, k
′′
12, k
′′
21, z)
qk12qk21qk′12qk′21qk′′12qk′′21pz
=
∑
k12k21k
′
12k
′
21k
′′
12k
′′
21t12t21z
p(t12, t21, z)P (φ12, ψ12, θ12, t12, k12, k
′
12, k
′′
12)P (φ21, ψ21, θ21, t21, k21, k
′
21, k
′′
21)×
log2
∑
t˜12 t˜21
p(t˜12, t˜21, z)P (φ12, ψ12, θ12, t˜12, k12, k
′
12, k
′′
12)P (φ21, ψ21, θ21, t˜21, k21, k
′
21, k
′′
21)
qk12qk21qk′12qk′21qk′′12qk′′21pz
(115)
Then, we focus on the log term in (115) and take the average over possible values of Φij(t˜nij)Ψij(t˜
n
ij) and Θij(t˜
n
ij)
for all t˜n12 6= tn12 and t˜n21 6= tn21 which is denoted by E˜. We have:
E˜(log2
∑
t˜12t˜21
p(t˜12,t˜21,z)P (φ12,ψ12,θ12,t˜12,k12,k
′
12,k
′′
12)P (φ21,ψ21,θ21, t˜21,k21,k
′
21,k
′′
21)
qk12qk21qk′12qk′21qk′′12qk′′21pz
)
(a)
≤ log2
E˜(
∑
t˜12t˜21
p(t˜12,t˜21,z)P (φ12,ψ12,θ12,t˜12,k12,k
′
12,k
′′
12)P (φ21,ψ21,θ21,t˜21,k21,k
′
21,k
′′
21))
qk12qk21qk′12qk′21pz
(116)
where (a) is deduced from Jensen’s inequality.
We extend various terms inside E˜ in (116) as follow:
E˜(
∑
t˜12t˜21
p(t˜12, t˜21, z)P (φ12, ψ12, θ12, t˜12, k12, k
′
12, k
′′
12)P (φ21, ψ21, θ21, t˜21, k21, k
′
21, k
′′
21))
= p(t12, t21, z)P (φ12, ψ12, θ12, t12, k12, k
′
12, k
′′
12)P (φ21, ψ21, θ21, t21, k21, k
′
21, k
′′
21)+∑
t˜21 6=t21
p(t12, t˜21, z)P (φ12, ψ12, θ12, t12, k12, k
′
12, k
′′
12)
1
2n(r21+r
′
21+r
′′
21)
+
∑
t˜12 6=t12
p(t˜12, t21, z)P (φ21, ψ21, θ21, t21, k21, k
′
21, k
′′
21)
1
2n(r12+r
′
12+r
′′
12)
+
∑
t˜12 6=t12t˜21 6=t21
p(t˜12, t˜21, z)
1
2n(r12+r
′
12+r
′′
12+r21+r
′
21+r
′′
21)
≤ p(t12, t21, z)P (φ12, ψ12, θ12, t12, k12, k′12, k′′12)P (φ21, ψ21, θ21, t21, k21, k′21, k′′21)+
p(t12, z)P (φ12, ψ12, θ12, t12, k12, k
′
12, k
′′
12)
1
2n(r21+r
′
21+r
′′
21)
+
p(t21, z)P (φ21, ψ21, θ21, t21, k21, k
′
21, k
′′
21)
1
2n(r12+r
′
12+r
′′
12)
+ p(z)
1
2n(r12+r
′
12+r
′′
12+r21+r
′
21+r
′′
21)
(117)
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Since qkij =
1
2nrij
, , qk′ij =
1
2
nr′
ij
and qk′′ij =
1
2
nr′′
ij
, the log term in (116) is obtained as:
log2
E˜(
∑
t˜12 t˜21
p(t˜12, t˜21, z)P (φ12, ψ12, θ12, t˜12, k12, k
′
12, k
′′
12)P (φ21, ψ21, θ21, ˜t21, k21, k
′
21, k
′′
21))
qk12qk21qk′12qk′21pz
≤ log2
(
p(t12,t21|z)P (φ12,ψ12,θ12,t12,k12,k′12,k′′12)P (φ21,ψ21,θ21,t21,k21,k′21,k′′21)2n(r12+r21+r
′
12+r
′
21+r
′′
12+r
′′
21)+
p(t12|z)P (φ12, ψ12, θ12, t12, k12, k′12, k′′12)2n(r12+r
′
12+r
′′
12)+
p(t21|z)P (φ21, ψ21, θ21, t21, k21, k′21, k′′21)2n(r21+r
′
21+r
′′
21) + 1
)
(118)
By substituting (118) in (115) and taking the average over all random binning mappings, we have:
EΦ12Ψ12Θ12Φ21Ψ21Θ21(D(PK12,K21,K′12,K′21,K′′12,K′′21,Zn ‖ qK12qK21qK′12qK′21qK′′12qK′′21PZn)) ≤∑
k12k21k
′
12k
′
21k
′′
12k
′′
21t12t21z
p(t12, t21, z)
∑
φ12(t12)ψ12(t12)θ12(t12)
P (φ12,ψ12,θ12,t12,k12,k
′
12,k
′′
12)
2n(r12+r
′
12+r
′′
12)
∑
φ21(t21)ψ21(t21)θ21(t21)
P (φ21,ψ21,θ21,t21,k21,k
′
21,k
′′
21)
2n(r21+r
′
21+r
′′
21)
× log2
(
p(t12, t21|z)P (φ12, ψ12, θ12, t12, k12, k′12, k′′12)P (φ21, ψ21, θ21, t21, k21, k′21, k′′21)2n(r12+r21+r
′
12+r
′
21+r
′′
12+r
′′
21)+
p(t12|z)P (φ12, ψ12, θ12, t12, k12, k′12, k′′12)2n(r12+r
′
12+r
′′
12)+
p(t21|z)P (φ21, ψ21, θ21, t21, k21, k′21, k′′21)2n(r21+r
′
21+r
′′
21) + 1
)
≤
∑
k12k21k
′
12k
′
21k
′′
12k
′′
21t12t21z
p(t12, t21, z)
∑
φ12(t12)ψ12(t12)θ12(t12)
P (φ12,ψ12,θ12,t12,k12,k
′
12,k
′′
12)
2n(r12+r
′
12+r
′′
12)
∑
φ21(t21)ψ21(t21)θ21(t21)
P (φ21,ψ21,θ21,t21,k21,k
′
21,k
′′
21)
2n(r21+r
′
21+r
′′
21)
× log2
(
p(t12, t21|z)2n(r12+r
′
12+r
′′
12+r21+r
′
21+r
′′
21) + p(t12|z)2n(r12+r
′
12) + p(t21|z)2n(r21+r
′
21) + 1
)
=
∑
t12t21z
p(t12,t21,z) log2
(
p(t12,t21|z)2n(r12+r
′
12+r
′′
12+r
′
21+r21+r
′′
21)+p(t12|z)2n(r12+r
′
12+r
′′
12)+p(t21|z)2n(r21+r
′
21+r
′′
21)+ 1
)
(119)
To analyze (119), we split the sum between the following sequences:
• If (t12, t21, z) ∈ T n′′(PT12T21Z), then the log term in (119) is upper bounded by
log2
(
2−n(H(T12,T21|Z)−2
′′)2n(r12+r
′
12+r
′′
12+r21+r
′
21+r
′′
21) + 2−n(H(T12|Z)−2
′′)2n(r12+r
′
12+r
′′
12)+
2−n(H(T21|Z)−2
′′)2n(r21+r
′
21+r
′′
21) + 1
)
(120)
By substituting Z = (Y3, T13, T23, S13, S23, S12, S21) in (120) and using the conditions (79)-(81) in Lemma
3, the log term in (120) can be bounded by log(3′′ + 1) for sufficiently large n.
• If (t12, t21, z) /∈ T n′′(PT12T21Z), then the log term in (119) is upper bounded by
log2
(
p(t12,t21|z)2n(r12+r′12+r′′12+r′21+r21+r′′21)+p(t12|z)2n(r12+r′12+r′′12)+p(t21|z)2n(r21+r′21+r′′21)+1
)
≤ log2
(
µ−n2n(r12+r
′
12+r
′′
12+r21+r
′
21+r
′′
21) + µ−n2n(r12+r
′
12+r
′′
12) + µ−n2n(r21+r
′
21+r
′′
21) + 1
)
≤ log2(3µ−n2n(r12+r
′
12+r
′′
12+r21+r
′
21+r
′′
21) + 1)
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where
µ , min
p(z)>0
p(z). (121)
Hence, the sum over the non-typical sequences is bounded by
′′ log2(3µ
−n2n(r12+r
′
12+r
′′
12+r21+r
′
21+r
′′
21)+1).
Finally, the sum in (119) is bounded as
E(D(PK12,K21,K′12,K′21,K′′12,K′′21,Y n3 ,Tn13,Tn23,Sn13,Sn23,Sn12,Sn21 ‖ qK12qK21qK′12qK′21qK′′12qK′′21PZn)) ≤
′′ log2(3µ
−n2n(r12+r
′
12+r
′′
12+r21+r
′
21+r
′′
21)+1)+log(3′′+1) (122)
which vanishes as n goes to infinity and ′′ goes to zero. To obtain (122) we substituted z as in (111).
The same approach as in Proposition 2 can be applied to the secondary keys between Users 1 and 3 and, between
Users 2 and 3. In particular, by using (82) and (83) in Lemma 3, we have:
E(D(PK13,K′13,K′′13,Y n2 ,Xn2 ,Sn12,Tn12,Sn13,Sn23,Tn23 ‖ qK13qK′13qK′′13PY n2 ,Xn2 ,Sn12,Tn12,Sn13,Sn23,Tn23)) ≤
′′ log2(µ
′−n2n(r13+r
′
13+r
′′
13) + 1) + log(′′ + 1) (123)
E(D(PK23,K′23,K′′23,Y n1 ,Xn1 ,Sn21,Tn21,Sn13,Sn23,Tn13 ‖ qK23qK′23qK′′23PY n1 ,Xn1 ,Sn21,Tn21,Sn13,Sn23,Tn13)) ≤
′′ log2(µ
′′−n2n(r23+r
′
23+r
′′
23) + 1) + log(′′ + 1) (124)
Now, we follow the result in Proposition 2 and also (123)-(124) to show strong secrecy of the secondary keys
between the users.
Lemma 5 (Strong secrecy of the secondary keys): If (79)-(83) hold, then there exist α > 0, β > 0 and γ > 0
such that
EΦΨ(D(PK12,K21,K′12,K′21,K′′12,K′′21,Y n3 ,Tn13,Tn23,Sn13,Sn23,Sn12,Sn21 ‖qK12qK21PY n3 ,Tn13,Tn23,Sn13,Sn23,Sn12,Sn21))≤2−αn (125)
E(D(PK13,K′13,K′′13,Y n2 ,Xn2 ,Sn12,Tn12,Sn13,Sn23,Tn23 ‖ qK13PY n2 ,Xn2 ,Sn12,Tn12,Sn13,Sn23,Tn23)) ≤ 2−βn (126)
E(D(PK23,K′23,K′′23,Y n1 ,Xn1 ,Sn21,Tn21,Sn13,Sn23,Tn13 ‖ qK23PY n1 ,Xn1 ,Sn21,Tn21,Sn13,Sn23,Tn13)) ≤ 2−γn (127)
It should be note that we performed the security analysis based on the simpler distribution P as in (31) in
Appendix A. To show that the same analysis is valid for the induced distribution P˜ from the encoding scheme as
in (30), we use the fact that according to (45), the distance between distributions P and P˜ is arbitrarily small and
hence the same security analysis holds for distribution P˜ .
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Furthermore, applying the same approach as in the decoding error probability analysis in Appendix A, we can
show:
EK′′12K′′21(D(PK12,K21,K′12,K′21,Y n3 ,Tn13,Tn23,Sn13,Sn23,Sn12,Sn21|K′′12,K′′21 ‖qK12qK21qK′12qK′21PY n3 ,Tn13,Tn23,Sn13,Sn23,Sn12,Sn21))≤2
−αn (128)
EK′′13(D(PK13,K′13,Y n2 ,Xn2 ,Sn12,Tn12,Sn13,Sn23,Tn23|K′′13 ‖ qK13qK′13PY n2 ,Xn2 ,Sn12,Tn12,Sn13,Sn23,Tn23)) ≤ 2
−βn (129)
EK′′23(D(PK23,K′23,Y n1 ,Xn1 ,Sn21,Tn21,Sn13,Sn23,Tn13|K′′23 ‖ qK23qK′23PY n1 ,Xn1 ,Sn21,Tn21,Sn13,Sn23,Tn13)) ≤ 2
−γn (130)
and similarly, for the chosen k
′′∗
12 , k
′′∗
21 , k
′′∗
13 and k
′′∗
23 in Appendix A, we have:
D(P
K12,K21,K
′
12,K
′
21,Y
n
3 ,T
n
13,T
n
23,S
n
13,S
n
23,S
n
12,S
n
21|k
′′∗
12 ,k
′′∗
21
‖ qK12qK21qK′12qK′21PY n3 ,Tn13,Tn23,Sn13,Sn23,Sn12,Sn21)) ≤ 3.2
−αn (131)
D(P
K13,K
′
13,Y
n
2 ,X
n
2 ,S
n
12,T
n
12,S
n
13,S
n
23,T
n
23|k
′′∗
13
‖ qK13qK′13PY n2 ,Xn2 ,Sn12,Tn12,Sn13,Sn23,Tn23)) ≤ 3.2
−βn (132)
D(P
K23,K
′
23,Y
n
1 ,X
n
1 ,S
n
21,T
n
21,S
n
13,S
n
23,T
n
13|k
′′∗
23
‖ qK23qK′23PY n1 ,Xn1 ,Sn21,Tn21,Sn13,Sn23,Tn13)) ≤ 3.2
−γn (133)
Hence, Lemma 3 in Appendix A is deduced.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THE OUTER BOUND IN THEOREM 2
Since the pre-generated keys scheme is a special case of the generalized scheme, the outer bound on the secret-
key capacity region of the generalized scheme applies to the pre-generated keys scheme, as well. Since, the upper
bounds on R12 are the same in Theorem 2 and Theorem 4, we refer the reader to the bound on R12 derived as
part of the proof of Theorem 4 in Appendix E. In the following, we only prove upper bounds on R13 and R23.
In the pre-generated keys scheme, Users 1 and 2 independently generate the uniformly distributed keys K13 and
K23, respectively, to share with User 3. After sending the channel inputs by Users 1 and 2, Y ni is received by User
i for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Applying Fano’s inequality on K13 and K23, for an arbitrary small  > 0, we obtain:
H(K13,K23|Y n3 ) ≤ n
(
h()
n
+  log(|K13||K23| − 1)
)
, n1 (134)
where |K13| is the cardinality of key set K13, and 1 → 0 if → 0. Furthermore, the security conditions should be
satisfied as:
I(K13;X
n
2 , Y
n
2 ) < n (135)
I(K23;X
n
1 , Y
n
1 ) < n (136)
Next, we show that for secret key K13 satisfying the reliability and security conditions, the upper bound on R13
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in Theorem 2 is satisfied. The upper bound on R23 may be proved in an identical way.
nR13 ≤ H(K13) + n
(a)
≤ H(K13|Xn2 , Y n2 ) + 2n
(b)
≤ H(K13|Xn2 , Y n2 )−H(K13|Y n3 ) + 2n+ n1
≤ H(K13|Xn2 , Y n2 )−H(K13|Xn2 , Y n2 , Y n3 ) + 2n+ n1
= I(K13;Y
n
3 |Xn2 , Y n2 ) + 2n+ n1
(c)
≤ I(Xn13;Y n3 |Xn2 , Y n2 ) + 2n+ n1
(d)
≤ nI(X13;Y3|X2, Y2) + 2n+ n1
where (a) results from the security condition (135), (b) from Fano’s inequality in (134), (c) from the Markov chain
K13 −Xn1 − (Xn2 , Y n1 , Y n2 , Y n3 ) and (d) from the memoryless property of the channel.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THE OUTER BOUND IN THEOREM 4
In the generalized scheme, after receiving the channel outputs, the users generate the corresponding keys as
stochastic functions of the information available at them. In particular, User 1 generates K12 and K13 for sharing
with Users 2 and 3, respectively, as stochastic functions of (Xn1 , Y
n
1 ). Similarly, Kˆ12 and K23 are generated by
User 2 for sharing with Users 1 and 3, respectively, as functions of (Xn2 , Y
n
2 ). User 3 estimates Kˆ13 and Kˆ23 as
stochastic functions of Y n3 .
For an arbitrary  > 0, applying Fano’s inequality to the keys yields
H(K12|Kˆ12) ≤ n
(
h()
n
+  log(|K12| − 1)
)
, n1 (137)
H(K13|Kˆ13) ≤ n
(
h()
n
+  log(|K13| − 1)
)
, n2 (138)
H(K23|Kˆ23) ≤ n
(
h()
n
+  log(|K23| − 1)
)
, n3 (139)
where |K12| is the cardinality of key set K12, and for i = 1, 2, 3, i → 0 if  → 0. Furthermore, the secrecy
conditions should be satisfied, i.e.,
I(K12;Y
n
3 ) < n (140)
I(K13;X
n
2 , Y
n
2 ) < n (141)
I(K23;X
n
1 , Y
n
1 ) < n (142)
We show next that for secret keys K12 and K13 satisfying the reliability and security conditions, R12 and R13
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must satisfy the upper bounds in Theorem 4. The upper bound on R23 may be proved in similar way to R13. To
upper bound on R12, first note that
nR12 ≤ H(K12) + n
(a)
≤ H(K12|Y n3 ) + 2n
(b)
≤ H(K12|Y n3 )−H(K12|Kˆ12) + 2n+ n1
≤ H(K12|Y n3 )−H(K12|Kˆ12, Xn2 , Y n2 ) + 2n+ n1
(c)
= H(K12|Y n3 )−H(K12|Xn2 , Y n2 ) + 2n+ n1
≤ I(K12;Xn2 , Y n2 |Y n3 ) + 2n+ n1
≤ I(K12, Xn1 , Y n1 ;Xn2 , Y n2 |Y n3 ) + 2n+ n1
(d)
= I(Xn1 , Y
n
1 ;X
n
2 , Y
n
2 |Y n3 ) + 2n+ n1
= I(Xn1 ;Y
n
2 |Xn2 , Y n3 ) + I(Xn2 ;Y n1 |Xn1 , Y n3 ) + I(Y n1 ;Y n2 |Xn1 , Xn2 , Y n3 ) + I(Xn1 ;Xn2 |Y n3 ) + n1 + 2n
(e)
≤
n∑
i=1
[I(X1,i;Y2,i|X2,i,Y3,i)+ I(X2,i;Y1,i|X1,i,Y3,i) +I(Y1,i;Y2,i|X1,i,X2,i,Y3,i)]+I(Xn1 ;Xn2 |Y n3 )+n1+2n
where (a) results from the security condition (140), (b) from Fano’s inequality in (137), (c) and (d) from the fact
that Kˆ12 and K12 are stochastic functions of (Xn2 , Y
n
2 ) and (X
n
1 , Y
n
1 ), respectively, so that Kˆ12 − (Xn2 , Y n2 ) −
(Xn1 , Y
n
1 ) −K12 forms a Markov chain. Inequality (e) follows since the first three terms can be single-letterized
using the memoryless property of the channel as, e.g.,
I(Xn1 ;Y
n
2 |Xn2 , Y n3 ) ≤
n∑
i=1
H(Y2,i|X2,i, Y3,i)−H(Y n2 |Xn1 , Xn2 , Y n3 )
=
n∑
i=1
[H(Y2,i|X2,i, Y3,i)−H(Y2,i|X1,i, X2,i, Y3,i)].
To single-letterize the fourth term, note that
I(Xn1 ;X
n
2 |Y n3 )
(a)
= I(Xn1 ;Y
n
3 |Xn2 )− I(Xn1 ;Y n3 )
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xn1 ;Y3,i|Xn2 , Y i−13 )− I(Xn1 ;Y n3 )
(b)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(X1,i;Y3,i|X2,i, Y i−13 )− I(Xn1 ;Y n3 )
=
n∑
i=1
I(X1,i;Y3,i|X2,i, Y i−13 )−
n∑
i=1
I(Xn1 ;Y3,i|Y i−13 )
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≤
n∑
i=1
I(X1,i;Y3,i|X2,i, Y i−13 )−
n∑
i=1
I(X1,i;Y3,i|Y i−13 )
(c)
=
n∑
i=1
[I(X1,i;Y3,i|X2,i, Ui)− I(X1,i;Y3,i|Ui)]
where (a) results from the independence of Xn1 and X
n
2 , (b) from the memoryless property of the channel and (c)
from the definition of auxiliary random variable Ui , Y i−13 . Combining all the above, we obtain
nR12 ≤
n∑
i=1
[I(X1,i;Y2,i|X2,i,Y3,i)+I(X2,i;Y1,i|X1,i,Y3,i)+I(Y1,i;Y2,i|X1,i, X2,i,Y3,i)
+ I(X1,i;Y3,i|X2,i, Ui)−I(X1,i;Y3,i|Ui)]+n1+2n.
Finally, introducing random variable Q which is uniformly distributed on {1, 2, ..., n} and independent of all the
other variables, and defining X1 = X1,Q, X2 = X2,Q, Y1 = Y1,Q, Y2 = Y2,Q, Y3 = (Y3,Q, Q), U = (UQ, Q), we
have
R12≤I(X1;Y2|X2,Y3)+I(X2;Y1|X1,Y3)+I(Y1;Y2|X1,X2,Y3)+I(X1;Y3|X2,U)−I(X1;Y3|U)+1+2
To upper bound on R13, note that
nR13 ≤ H(K13) + n
(a)
≤ H(K13|Xn2 , Y n2 ) + 2n
(b)
≤ H(K13|Xn2 , Y n2 )−H(K13|Kˆ13) + 2n+ n2
≤ H(K13|Xn2 , Y n2 )−H(K13|Kˆ13, Y n3 ) + 2n+ n2
(c)
= H(K13|Xn2 , Y n2 )−H(K13|Y n3 ) + 2n+ n2
≤ I(K13;Y n3 |Xn2 , Y n2 ) + 2n+ n2
≤ I(K13, Xn1 , Y n1 ;Y n3 |Xn2 , Y n2 ) + 2n+ n2
(d)
= I(Xn1 , Y
n
1 ;Y
n
3 |Xn2 , Y n2 ) + 2n+ n2
(e)
≤ nI(Y3;X1, Y1|X2, Y2) + n2 + 2n
where (a) results from the security condition (141), (b) from Fano’s inequality in (138), (c) and (d) from the fact
that Kˆ13 and K13 are stochastic functions of Y n3 and (X
n
1 , Y
n
1 ), respectively, so that Kˆ13−Y n3 − (Xn1 , Y n1 )−K13
forms a Markov chain. Inequality (e) follows from the memoryless property of the channel.
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